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A recurring concern among observers of corporate governance 
issues is whether the law is doing enough to curb self-dealing by 
corporate officers and directors.1 Some commentators would sug-
gest that this concern is misplaced, inasmuch as transactions be-
tween corporations and their managers are merely an efficient 
means of providing executive compensation. Others argue that 
market forces will make it difficult for corporations which engage 
in such transactions to raise capital, and that the presence of 
market mechanisms has already minimized self-dealing.2 
These assertions reflect an unwarranted confidence in the ef-
fectiveness of market-based and other existing deterrents to self-
dealing. They certainly suggest a failure to appreciate the degree 
to which material corporate conflict of interest transactions occur. 
Consider Crazy Eddie, Inc., a New York electronics firm which, 
prior to going public in 1984, was controlled by the Antar family. 
During this period, the Antars "virtually [used] the company as a 
private bank. "3 • 
Crazy Eddie ... made interest-free loans totalling $470,000 to 
some of the Antars. It . . . paid two of their wives $75,000 each. 
1. See, e.g., Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 
95 HARV. L. REv. 597, 609-22 (1982); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE oF THE CoRPORATION 
30-36 (1976); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 112-15 
(1976); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 
Bus. LAw. 35, 54-57 (1966). 
This topic has been vigorously debated by participants in the American Law Institute 
Project on Corporate Governance, since its inception. See THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, 
PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GovERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 
3, 1984; Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986; Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRINCIPLES]. 
Tentative Draft No. 5 ("Duty of Loyalty") reflected "very considerable revision both in 
structure and content of the formulation that appeared in earlier stages of the project." 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 10. It nonetheless provoked continu-
ing controversy and was remanded to the Reporters for further revision, resulting in the 
issuance of Tentative Draft No. 7. Perkins, The Genesis and Goals of the ALI Corporate 
Governance Project, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 661, 679 (1987). 
2. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. 
3. Jacobs, Taking it to the Street, Wall St. J ., May 19, 1986, § 4 (A Special Report, 
Small Business), at 31D, col. 2. 
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And the New York-area company was owed more than $3 mil-
lion by other Antar [family] enterprises, including a son-in-law's 
audio and videocassette business with the concession to sell 
tapes in Crazy Eddie stores. 
A shoe-store chain, which had filed a petition under federal 
bankruptcy law, controlled by another relative had $500,000 of 
its debts guaranteed by Crazy Eddie. And yet another troubled 
Antar business [with ties to Crazy Eddie] was a Caribbean med-
ical school, the University of St. Lucia School of Medicine, 
which [had] since closed. • 
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Or consider Allegheny International, Inc., a poorly-performing 
Fortune 500 company whose directors approved $32.3 million in 
low-interest (2%) loans for themselves and several Allegheny ex-
ecutives;11 a $10,000 per day consulting contract to one of its 
outside directors;6 a $16 million purchase of a controlling interest 
in a Florida condominium complex in which top Allegheny of-
ficers had substantial financial interests;7 and the purchase of the 
Dover Hotel "for the benefit of [the Chairman's] son, who oc-
cupie[d] a $1 million penthouse suite" there.8 Disgruntled share-
holders claimed that overall, Allegheny's directors sanctioned 
widespread abuse of executive perquisites and nepotism in hiring, 
"used and wasted the company's assets for their personal benefit 
and embarked upon a reckless acquisition and expansion spree 
[that] brought the Company to the brink of ruin."9 The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) concluded that many of Alle-
gheny's self-dealing transactions were not sufficiently disclosed to 
its shareholders10 and Allegheny's self-dealing management has 
now been replaced. 11 
Transactions and business relationships like those attributed to 
Crazy Eddie and Allegheny International-those (1) providing fi-
nancial benefits to corporate managers (and their families) appar-
4. Id. 
5. Symonds, Big Trouble at Allegheny, Bus. WK., Aug. 11, 1986, at 56, 60; Complaint, 
Allegheny Int'l Inc. v. Haig, No. 86-1648 (W.D. Pa. 1986), 11 39(iv). 
6. Symonds, supra note 5, at 60; Complaint, supra note 5, at 11 39(i). 
7. Symonds, supra note 5, at 56-57, 60; Complaint, supra note 5, at 11 39(vi). 
8. Complaint, supra note 5, at 11 39(viii). The son, Christopher Buckley, was also in-
stalled as hotel manager, even though he had no hotel experience. Symonds, supra note 5, 
at 59. 
9. Complaint, supra note 5, at 11 5(b). 
10. Allegheny International Sued by SEC, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1987, at 10, col. 1. 
11. Allegheny International's Chief Faces Rebuilding Task, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, 
at 6, col. 1; Allegheny International Posts Big Loss, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 5, col. 2. 
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ently in excess of appropriate compensation and (2) potentially 
detrimental to the interests of non-management sharehold-
ers-are not merely anecdotal. The author has recently under-
taken a survey of ninety-two American corporations, the results 
of which indicate that both privately-held and publicly-held cor-
porations frequently engage in substantial conflict of interest 
transactions with their officers and dii:ectors. 
Of the forty-four privately-held corporations surveyed, 97.7% 
had engaged in transactions during the preceding three years in 
which officers or directors had received benefits at least $60,000 
in excess of their routine compensation through some conflict of 
interest mechanism.12 Among the forty-eight publicly-held corpo-
rations, 77% had engaged in such transactions during their most 
recent operating year. 
This Article first reviews the empirical data and explores the 
nature of the transactions in which corporate officers and direc-
tors received corporate payments beyond their routine compensa-
tion and in some cases beyond what would appear to be reasona-
ble compensation. It distinguishes the types of self-dealing 
transactions common to privately-held corporations from those 
common to publicly-held ones. It then attempts to identify those 
transactions, in both private and publicly-held contexts, which 
cannot be supported as a means of providing reasonable compen-
sation or as an exercise of sound business judgment-in short, 
those which ought to be deterred as a matter of public policy. 
The Article then identifies existing deterrents to unacceptable 
corporate self-dealing transactions and explores why those deter-
rents have been largely ineffective. Finally, the Article reviews 
several policy responses which have been or might be considered, 
and makes some tentative policy recommendations. 
I. THE ScoPE OF THE PHENOMENON 
A. Privately-Held Corporations 
Identifying the degree to which privately-held corporations are 
making payments to their officers and directors in excess of rou-
tine compensation is methodologically imprecise. No state re-
quires its domiciliary corporations to provide public record disclo-
' 
12. For purposes of this Article, "routine compensation" is defined, in the case of of-
ficers and employees, as salary and authorized bonuses and stock options; in the case of 
directors, as directors' fees and stock purchase rights. '" 
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sure of corporate conflict of interest transactions. Only California 
requires certain of its domiciliary corporations to disclose such 
transactions to their shareholders, and those reports are not made 
part of any public record.13 Thus, there is no uniform repository 
for information concerning the transactions of privately-held cor-
porations in which officers and directors receive personal benefit 
. in excess of routine compensation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to review the conflict of interest ex-
periences of a subset of privately-held corporations. Closely-held 
corporations which choose to "go public" are subject to the dis-
closure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.14 Specifically, 
such companies must file with the SEC a Form S-1 Registration 
Statement, n which contains a broad range of information about 
the registrant, including retrospective conflict of interest informa-
tion as required by Item 404 of Regulation S-K!6 
This writer reviewed seventy-two Form S-1 Registration State-
ments for initial public offerings filed with the SEC consecutively 
during June, 1986. After deleting from consideration debenture 
offerings and reorganizations of established companies, conver-
sions by mutual financial institutions and insurance companies, 
corporate spin-offs, going-private transactions and limited part-
nership offerings, each of which seemed to present conflict of in-
13. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1981). 
15. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1987). 
16. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (1987). In the context of initial public offerings, Item 404 re-
quires disclosure of all transactions dating back three years preceding registration up to 
and including those which are anticipated at the time of registration, in which the regis-
trant (or its subsidiaries) was or is expected to be a party, in which the amount involved 
exceeds $60,000, and in which any executive officer, director, or member of his immediate 
family "had, or will have, a direct or indirect material interest." 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) 
(1987). Members of a person's "immediate family" include his spouse, parents, children, 
siblings, mothers- and fathers-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law, and brothers- and sis-
ters-in-law. ld. 
Whether such a person has a "material interest" in any transaction(s) is to be deter-
mined by the registrant, taking into account " [t]he importance of the interest to the per-
son having the interest, the relationship of the parties to the transaction(s) with each 
other and the amount involved in the transactions." ld. 
Disclosure is required regardless of whether the interested persons profited or lost from 
the transaction(s). Id. Disclosure is not required if the interest represents less than a 10% 
equity ownership of another corporation furnishing services to the registrant or if the 
transaction represents rates or charges which were determined by competitive bids. Id. 
Item 404 also requires disclosure of loans made by the corporation during the preceding 
fiscal year to directors, executive officers, or members of their immediate families, in ex-
cess of $60,000. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987). 
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terest problems uncharacteristic of more conventional nonpublic 
entities, forty-four companies remained, which for the remainder 
of this Article shall be referred to as the "pre-public" companies. 
The review of these companies' Form S-l's disclosed that in the 
period immediately preceding their initial public offerings, all but 
one had engaged in transactions with (and consequently had pro-
vided non-routine benefits to) officers, family members or busi-
nesses controlled by them, significant enough to be reportable 
under Item 404.17 At the same time, more than half of them had 
engaged in "reverse" conflict of interest transactions by which the 
corporations received benefits (such as loans or loan guarantees) 
from their officers, directors, their family members or affiliated 
entities. 18 
A selection of the conflict of interest disclosures contained in 
the Form S-1 sample illustrates the sorts of self-dealing transac-
tions common to these relatively small, "pre-public" ventures. 
These transactions may be categorized as they most frequently 
appeared-transfers of real estate to and from corporate manag-
ers; insider loans; consulting agreements with "outside" directors 
and miscellaneous conflict of interest transactions (including in-
vestments in manager-operated businesses, operating agreements 
and licensing agreements). 
1. Acquisitions of Property and Equipment from Management 
Insiders 
On September 1, 1984, the Company leased property for a 
center in San Francisco from a California limited partnership 
which includes as partners the three children and a son-in-law 
17. It should be noted that the nature and extent of management self-dealing among 
corporations going public is not necessarily reflective of conflict of interest transactions 
occurring among corporations with no present or future intention of going public. Evi-
dence suggests that the phenomenon of self-dealing is even more common among closely-
held corporations than among those privately-held corporations which go public. See, e.g. , 
Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers-Every Business Now a Bank? (to be 
published shortly in the 1988 Wisconsin Law Review). This can be attributed, in part, to 
the sanitizing influence which accompanies the expectation of going public, cf. infra note 
133 and accompanying text, and, in ·part, to the reality that many closely-held companies 
are simply alter egos for their owners, who feel free to strip corporate resources for their 
personal benefit to a degree that entrepreneurs with growth aspirations may not. 
18. It is assumed throughout this Article that such transactions reflect a beneficial, per-
haps life-infusing, managerial role rather than a predatory one. They are therefore re-
ferred to, albeit with some hesitation, as "benefactor" transactions. See, e.g., Neidert v. 
Neidert, 637 S.W.2d 296 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (loans made to corporation by shareholders). 
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of [the founder and president of the corporation and his wife.] 19 
On June 28, 1985, the Company purchased [a plant] from [a 
named land trust] for a purchase price of $750,000 .... [A] di-
rector and consultant for the Company, and certain members of 
[his] family own a 100% beneficial interest in the land trust.20 
The Company leases its headquarters from a partnership [com-
posed of corporate officers or directors].21 
[The Company] leases certain computer equipment for its own 
data processing department from [a partnership in which 50% 
interests are held respectively by the president and executive 
vice president of the Company. Payments in 1984 totalled 
$98,642; in 1985, $122,105; in 1986, $91,838] .... The Company 
also rents data processing equipment . . . for sublease. . . . The 
Company has purchased and sold data processing equipment to 
and from [several partnerships controlled by these officers] and 
such equipment has been sold to third parties at prices approxi-
mately paid by or to [sic] the Company .... The Company 
leases office space . . . from [one of the-partnerships controlled 
by the same parties] ... and has provided certain administra-
tive services [to it] without charge.22 
2. . Favorable Loans to Management Insiders 
In May 1984, the Company loaned . . . the Chairman of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer . . . approximately $154,450 
pursuant to an interest-free .. . not~ to assist in the purchase of 
a home in connection with his relocation to New Jersey.28 
In June 1985 the Company loaned [the president] $125,000.24 
The Company made two personal loans in April, 1986 aggregat-
ing $110,000 to [the] Chairman of the Board and President of 
the Company.26 
From time to time since the formation of the Company . . . the 
Company has made certain advances to its officers [totalling 
$339,350 per person, repayable with no interest, during the fiscal 
19. American Learning Corp., Form S-1 No. 33-6379, filed June 11, 1986, at 20. 
20. Nichols Homeshield, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6108, filed June 2, 1986, at 27. 
21. American Woodmark Corp., Form S-1 No. 33-6245, filed June 6, 1986, at 19. 
22. NFC Leasing Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6018, filed June 3, 1986, at 18-19. 
23. Liposome Co., Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6468, filed June 13, 1986, at 35. 
24. Applied Control Systems, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6410, filed June 11, 1986, at 24. 
25. Matthews & Wright Group, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6477, filed June 13, 1986, at 32. , 
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year ending April 30, 1986.r~e 
3. "Consulting" Agreements with Directors 
The Company has retained the firm of [RM], Inc. as its public 
relations firm since July 1984. The Company's payments on this 
account were approximately $60,000 during fiscal [year] 1984, 
$280,000 during fiscal [year] 1985 and $57,000 during the first 
quarter of fiscal [year] 1986. [A] director of [the Company] 
serves as Chairman of the Board of [RM], Inc.27 
F9r the 12 months ended June 1, 1986, . . . a business owned by 
... a director of the Company, received approximately $87,000 
for consulting services provided to the Company.28 
In January 1985, the Company entered into an Advisory Agree-
ment with [NC] Corp. . . . pursuant to which [NC] Corp. ren-
dered to the company financial advisory consulting services for a 
monthly consulting fee. [NC] Corp. is an affiliate of {a director 
, of the Company. The total paid to [NC] Corp. in 1985 was 
$22,000].29 
In fiscal [year] 1985 the Company paid legal fees totalling 
$18,359 to . . . a law firm in which . . . a director of the Com-
pany, is president.80 
4. Other Transactions 
Since April 1, 1983, several affiliated parties, including [the 
president and CEO of the Company], his spouse and children 
and various directors and officers of the Company, have held 
interests in entities that own or have owned franchises [associ-
ated with the Company]. 81 
The Company maintains life insurance policies on the life of [an 
officer/director] totalling $10,250,000. The proceeds of policies 
in the amount of $7,250,000 are payable to a life insurance trust 
established for the benefit of [certain shareholders affiliated 
with the officer]. . . . The Company also maintains for its own 
26. Bonneville Pacific Corp., Form S-1 No. 33·6460, filed June 13, 1986, at 22. 
27. Convex Computer Corp., Form S-1 No. 33-6109, filed June 2, 1986, at 28. 
28. Sunrizon Homes, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6026, filed June 3, 1986, at 20. 
29. Southlife Holding Co., Form S-1 No. 33-6405, filed June 11, 1986, at 28. 
30. Applied Control Systems, Inc., supra note 24, at 26. 
31. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6119, filed June 2, 1986, at 27. 
1988] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
benefit a key-man life insurance policy on the life of [the officer] 
in the amount of $3,000,000.82 
The Company has guaranteed a $300,000 line of credit to MBI, 
which is currently fully utilized. [The president and CEO of 
MBI is also chairman of the board of the Company].88 
In June 1982, the Company conveyed a number of royalty and 
overriding royalty interests in certain coal leases to [a trust, the 
beneficiaries of whom are several officers and directors of the 
Company plus their children. The income from these royalties 
totalled $10.5 million during 1983, $12 million during 1984 and 
$11.4 million during 1985).8• 
377 
The pre-public corporations in the Form S-1 sample freely uti-
lized all four forms of conflict of interest mechanisms, favoring 
them in the following order: miscellaneous transactions ( 54.5% of 
reporting companies), consulting agreements (54.5% ), loans to of-
ficers, directors and affiliates ( 43.2% ) , and property transactions 
(38.6% ). The amounts involved were in many cases significant, 
ranging up to $982,000 annually for property rentals, $339,000 for 
individual insider loans, and $606,000 for consulting agreements. 
Inasmuch as the "miscellaneous" transactions frequently did not . 
involve direct transfers of cash, they are more difficult to quan-
tify, but one involved the guaranty of the unrelated business 
debts of two corporate executives totalling $982,7 463~ and another 
involved payment of $322,000 in "dealer fees."36 
Registrants frequently defended these transactions by offering 
such comments as "[t]he company believes that the terms of this 
[transaction] are comparable to other [transactions] the Company 
has entered into with unaffiliated [businesses]."37 Some of these 
32. Quidel, Form S-1 No. 33-6278, filed June 6, 1986, at 30. 
33. Id. at 32. 
34. Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6168, filed June 2, 1986, at 29-30. 
35. Transworld Music Corp., Form S-1 No. 33-6449, filed June 13, 1986, at 20. 
36. Cellular Communications, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6514, filed June 17, 1986, at 31. 
37. American Learning Corp., supra note 19, at 20. See also Union Valley Corp., Form 
S-1 No. 33-6111, filed June 2, 1986, at 34 ("The company believes that each management 
agreement is on terms and conditions at least as favorable to the company as those availa-
ble from unaffiliated third parties."); Convex Computer Corp., supra note 27, at 28; Pa-
cific Southwest Airlines, Form S-1 No. 33-6024, filed June 3, 1986, at 17; Shoe City Corp., 
Form S-1 No. 33-6201, filed June 4, 1986, at 23; American Woodmark Corp., supra note 
21, at 19; Bonneville Pacific Corp., supra note 26, at 22; O'Brien Energy Systems, Inc., 
Form S-1 No. 33-6463, filed June 13, 1986, at 30; Cellular Communications, Inc., supra 
note 36, at 31. 
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assertions were not entirely convincing: 
In the opinion of [the Company's] board, of which Mr. [S] is one 
of two members, the legal fees charged by Mr. (S's] law firm are 
as reasonable as and no greater than those which would have 
been charged by an unaffiliated law firm with comparable ex-
pertise for the same services. 38 
Other registrants disclosed the terms of their transactions, but 
simultaneously announced that these relationships were being 
terminated, effective upon the success of the public offering. 89 A 
few announced not only the termination of previous contractual 
arrangements but a revealing change in their corporate practices: 
The Company has adopted a policy that transactions between 
the Company and its officers, directors, principal shareholders 
or affiliates of any of them will be on terms no less favorable to 
the company than could be obtained from unaffiliated parties 
and will be approved by a majority of the independent and dis-
interested directors of the company.'0 
B. Publicly-Held Corporations 
Ascertaining the scope of self-dealing transactions among pub-
licly-held corporations is far easier than in the case of closely-held 
corporations. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934'1 and accom-
38. Beta Resources, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6353, filed June 10, 1986, at 16. 
39. E.g., NFC Leasing Co., supra note 22, at 18 ("The Company is in the process of 
terminating these leases; .... [S]uch insurance is now maintained solely for the benefit 
of the Company."). See also Southlife Holding Co., supra note 29, at 28 (terminating a 
monthly consulting agreement with a director, effective June 30, 1986); Quidel, supra note 
32, at 30 (terminating insurance policies effective upon the closing of the offering). 
40. Sunrizon Homes, Inc., supra note 28, at 21. See also Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., supra 
note 31, at 25 ("The Company has recently adopted a policy that any transactions with 
affiliates will require prior approval by the Audit Committee of the board of directors, 
which is composed only of outside directors."); Native Plants, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6467, 
filed June 13, 1986, at 31 ("The Company intends that any future loans made by the 
Company to officers, directors, key employees and their affiliates will be made only for 
reasonable business purposes and with the approval of a majority of the Company's inde-
pendent, disinterested directors."); Xyvision, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6015, filed June 3, 
1986, at 25; Liposome Co., supra note 23, at 35; Transworld Music Corp., supra note 35, at 
20; Matthews & Wright Group, Inc., supra note 25, at 32; Watts Industries, Inc., Form S-1 
No. 33-6515, filed June 17, 1986, at 18; MNX, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6550, filed June 17, 
1986, at 19; Microcom, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6569, filed June 18, 1986, at 24; Herschel's 
Deli & Bakery, Inc., Form S-1 No. 33-6698, filed June 18, 1986, at 24; Continental Homes 
Holding Corp., Form S-1 No. 33-6797, filed June 26, 1986, at 24. 
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1981). 
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panying regulations require registration with. the SEC of all issu-
ers whose securities are traded on a national securities ex-
change, 42 and all issuers having total assets exceeding $5,000,000 
and 500 or more equity shareholders.43 Every issuer registered 
with the SEC must file periodic reports with the agency, includ-
ing a lengthy annual report on Form 10-K.44 Form 10-K requires 
disclosure of a wide range of corporate information, and specifi-
cally requires the issuer to disclose annually those transactions 
covered by Item 404 of Regulation S-K!~ 
The author reviewed forty-eight Form 10-K's filed with the 
SEC during October 1986. These 10-K's represented Fortune 500 
companies, "household word" companies, and many largely un-
known although, for SEC purposes, "public" companies. The 
shares of seventeen of these companies were, at the time of filing, 
traded on one or more stock exchanges, and the shares of thirty-
one companies were traded over-the-counter or were inactive. 
Many of the conflict of interest transactions reported by these 
"already public" companies were similar to those found in the 
pre-public companies.46 
The range in values for the conflict of interest transactions of 
42. 15 u.s.c. § 781 (1976). 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (1987); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1987). 
44. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1987). 
45. 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (1987). See supra note 17. 
46. The following disclosures, grouped according to transaction type, are representative 
of the Form 10-K sample: 
(a) Property and Equipment Transactions 
[Several officers and directors of the Company] own 77% of a corporation 
which leases a manufacturing plant and equipment in Cuba, Missouri to the 
Company. Bailey Corp., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 28, 1986, at 21. 
Bastian [a subsidiary] leases the building in which it operates from a part-
nership composed of four individuals, one of whom is a vice-president of Bas-
tian. Metal Arts Co., Inc., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 28, 1986, at 44. 
(b) Favorable Loans 
[The Company's board approved a $400,000 10% loan to a substantial 
shareholder to exercise a special $2/share stock option, later amended to 
make it non-interest bearing.] Aero Energy Corp., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 28, 
1986, at 18. 
As of September 30, 1986, [the] Vice President and Trustee of the Trust 
and an employee of the Trust and its predecessors for 29 years, was indebted 
to the Trust in the amount of $108,742 . . . . Of this amount $4,000 is a 
demand non-interest bearing education loan made to assist [the Vice Presi-
dent] in providing tuition for his children in college. [The remainder, repay-
able at 12%, was to facilitate share purchases.] New Plan Realty Trust, Form 
10-K, filed Oct. 29, 1986, at 36-37. 
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the publicly-held corporations was consistently higher than those 
found in the pre-public corporations. For example, property rent-
als ranged up to $1,440,000 annually; insider loan authorizations 
ranged up to $840,000; and consulting agreements ranged up to 
$2,462,008. Miscellaneous transactions included a $15 million 
purchase of a business· from an executive's wife"7 and· the 
purchase of a 39% interest in a savings and loan in which the 
company's Chairman and CEO are, respectively, Vice-President 
and Chairman. 48 
[The Company's new group Vice President for Marketing and Communica-
tions was provided a $200,000 interest-free loan] "only to purchase a new 
residence." Redken Laboratories, Inc., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 29, 1986, at 
Item 11. 
(c) Consulting Agreements 
Allen & Company Incorporated ... of which· [a director of the Company] 
is a vice president and managing director .. . received $1,100,000 in cash for 
its services as placement agent for [the Company.'s] private placement of the 
Debentures. Integrated Barter Int'l, Inc., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 28, 1986, at 
48. 
[The Company] has paid consulting fees to [a corporation] in which [a sub-
stantial shareholder of the Company] had a financial interest [from August 1, 
1985 to October 22, 1985, these fees totalled $127 ,177; for the year ending 
July 31, 1985, they totalled $552,000, and for the year ending July 31, 1984, 
they totalled $517,000.) In addition, the Company buys insurance from bro-
kerage companies in which certain directors of the Company have a financial 
interest. [The premiums for the year ending July 31, 1986 totalled $303,000. 
For the year ending July 31, 1985, they totalled $496,000, and for the year 
ending July 31, 1984, $484,000.] Simplicity Mfg. Co., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 
28, 1986, at 24. 
[The Chairman of the Board] has a 3-year consulting agreement to provide 
up to 25 hours per month of management consulting for $5,000 per month. 
ATI Medical, Inc., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 29, 1986, at 22. 
(d) Other Transactions 
The Company acquired the assets of SNC in June, 1984 for $8.2 million in 
cash. [A director of the Company owns a 47.5% interest in SNC. Integrated 
Barter Int'l, Inc., supra at 51.) 
The Company entered into a Facilities Management Service Agreement 
.. . with JHPC, a professional medical corporation of which a 28.9% share-
holder of the Company, is the sole shareholder . ... JHPC and its predeces-
sors owed the Company approximately $208,507 as of July 31, 1986 .... 
H&S Treat & Release, Inc., Form 10-K, filed . Oct. 29, 1986, at 30; see also 
Langer Biomechanics Group, Inc., Form 10-K, filed Oct. 29, 1986, at 55 (facil-
ities management agreement with partnership composed of company's of-
ficers and directors). 
47. Integrated Barter Int'l, Inc., supra note 46, at 51. 
48. WASHINGTON HoMES, INc., Paoxv STATEMENT 8-9 (1986), incorporated by reference 
in Form 10-K, filed Oct. 29, 1986. 
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"Already-public" companies engaged in proportionately fewer 
of all types of conflict of interest transactions than pre-public 
companies. Moreover, the overall profile of transactions reported 
by the already-public companies differed from that found in the 
registration statements of the pre-public companies, as reflected 
in Figure 1.49 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Figure 1 
LOANS TO 
PROPERTY DIRECTORS, OFFICERS CONSULTING "BENEFACTOR 
TRANSACTIONS & AFFILIATES AGREEMENTS MISCELLANEOUS TRANSACTIONS" 
38.6 35.4 43.2 16.7 54.5 33.3 
D = "pre-public" companies 
~ = public, reporting companies 
54.5 43.8 52.3 25.0 
49. Some qualitative differences are not reflected in this Figure. For example, the stated 
purpose for several of the loans by the public companies was to permit the exercise of 
stock option rights, which was never the stated purpose for loans made by the pre-public 
companies, presumably because they had not yet reached a state of maturity sufficient to 
generate such opportunities. (Some of the pre-public corporations did, however, grant 
loans to directors to finance basic stock purchases.) In a similar light, several of the public 
companies had "golden parachute" agreements inuring to the benefit of corporate manag-
ers, whereas none of the pre-public companies did. 
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What do these samples indicate? At the very least, they demon-
strate that conflict of interest transactions between corporations 
and their officers and directors constitute a substantial business 
phenomenon in corporations of all sizes. 60 But frequency alone 
does not indicate whether this phenomenon requires some public 
policy response. What matters is the quality and consequences of 
these transactions. 
II. THE REQUISITE VocABULARY 
In considering whether a particular extra-compensatory trans-
action between a corporation and its officers or directors is desir-
able, benign, or cause for deterrence, one must deal initially with 
questions of definition. 
A. uconflicts of Interest" 
There is no uniform protocol for determining whether or not a 
particular corporate transaction involves a "conflict of interest" 
on the part of its officers or directors. A number of definitions 
have been advanced. The Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act (RMBCA)61 defines a conflict of interest transaction as one 
"with the corporation in which a director of the corporation has a 
direct or indirect interest. "62 "Direct interest" is not defined in 
the RMBCA, although the official commentary thereto includes 
within the concept of direct interest any transaction where the 
director "or the immediate members of his family have a financial 
interest in the transaction or a relationship with the other parties 
to the transaction such that the relationship might reasonably be 
expected to affect his judgment. "63 
An "indirect interest" arises under the RMBCA if a transaction 
involves 
(1) another entity in which [the director] has a material finan-
cial interest or in which he is a general partner ... or (2) an-
other entity of which he is a director, officer or trustee ... and 
the transaction is or should be considered by the board of direc-
50. Figure 1 may also indicate the efficacy of mandatory disclosure requirements and/or 
hypothesized market forces as a deterrent to certain types of conflict of interest transac-
tions. See infra text accompanying notes 161-65. 
51. REVISED MODEL BusiNESS CoRP. AcT (1984) [hereinafter RMBCA]. 
52. /d. § 8.31(a). 
53. /d. § 8.31 comment 5. 
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tors of the corporation.11' 
Inexplicably, the RMBCA does not concern itself with conflict of 
interest transactions involving corporate officers or non-officer 
executives.~~ 
The most recent published drafts of the ALI Proposed Princi-,. 
ples of Corporate Governance addressing the issue of conflict of 
interest~6 articulate a similar definition. Within the rubric of the 
"duty of loyalty,"~7 certain procedural requirements are imposed 
when any director, "senior executive,"~8 or "dominating share-
holder"~9 enters into a transaction with the corporation "other 
than a transaction involving the payment of compensation."60 
T~e transactions governed by this provision may include "sup-
plying property to the corporation or acquiring property from the 
corporation, by sale, lease, or otherwise, furnishing services to the 
corporation · in some capacity other than as a director or senior 
executive (such as an investment advisor, investment banker, or 
attorney), supplying or acquiring services from the corporation, or 
making loans to or receiving loans from the corporation. "61 They 
54. /d . § 8.31(b). 
55. The official commentary to the RMBCA suggests, however, that a transaction in-
volving officers may be challenged on the ground that it constitutes waste, that "it was not 
authorized by the appropriate body, that it violated other sections of the [RMBCA] or 
that it was unenforceable under other common law principles." RMBCA, supra note 51, 
comment 1. 
56. See A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Drafts Nos. 5 and 7. 
57. Note that this terminology is proposed to be changed to the "duty of fair-dealing." 
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Drafts Nos. 5 and 7. 
58. "Senior executive" is defined in Tentative Draft No. 5, §§ 1.28 and 1.22, as including 
a corporation's "chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and accounting officers . .. 
chairman of the board of directors (unless the chairman neither performs a policymaking 
function other than as a director, nor receives a material amount of compensation in ex-
cess of director's fees), president, treasurer, secretary and controller, and [any] vice-presi-
dent who is in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, 
administration, or finance) or performs a major policymaking function for the corpora-
tion." /d. 
59. "Dominating shareholder" is defined in Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.12, as any share-
holder who, either alone or with others, "owns, and has the unrestricted power to vote, 
more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of a corporation" or otherwise in 
fact exercises control over the management. /d. 
60. /d., Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.02(a). 
61. /d., Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.02 comment c. Section 5.02 generally does not apply to 
"transactions involving fungible goods or services that are offered generally to the public 
upon terms fixed in advance ... by the person offering the service or property." /d. Addi-
tionally, section 5.02 generally would not apply to transactions "whose terms are not nego-
tiated, but rather are determined by competitive bids submitted to the corporation, unless 
it appears that competition has been artificially diminished or eliminated through the 
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include transactions which involve "associates"62 of directors or 
senior executives, including a spouse, child, parent or sibling.63 An 
"associate" may also be "any person for whom a director, senior 
executive or shareholder has financial responsibility or with 
yvhom he has a business relationship, that is sufficiently substan-
tial that it would reasonably be expected to affect his judgment 
with respect to the transaction in question in a manner adverse to 
the corporation. "8" 
Neither the RMBCA or the proposed Principles of Corporate 
Governance limit the concept of conflict of interest transactions 
to those involving some minimum amount of money. A conflict of 
interest exists under these formulations even where the cost to 
the corporation or the financial benefit to the interested person is 
de minimis. 
For purposes of this Article, a conflict of interest transaction is 
defined as one in which either a director, executive officer or 
holder of at least 10% ownership in a corporation (the "interested 
person") has a direct or indirect interest. 'A direct interest arises 
when the interested person is himself the contracting party. An 
indirect interest may arise out of several situations, including the 
following: 
(a) the interested person serves as a director or officer of or has 
at least a 10% equity ownership in the contracting entity; 
(b) any member of the immediate family of the interested per-
son is the contracting party. The "immediate family" includes a 
spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers and fathers-in-law, 
sons and daughers-in-law and brothers and sisters-in-law; 
(c) any member of the immediate family of the interested per-
son serves as a director or officer of, or has at least a 10% equity 
ownership in, the contracting entity. 
B. "Material Conflicts of Interest" 
The term "material conflict of interest transaction" lends itself, 
unfortunately, to two differing interpretations. A conflict of inter-
est transaction may be material to the corporation in an account-
ing sense.n Regardless of whether the transaction is material in 
framing of specifications or other devices." Id. 
62. /d., Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.08. 
63. /d. § 1.02(a)(l). 
64. /d. § 1.02(a)(2). 
65. "In spite of its pervasiveness, .materiality remains an ill defined concept. There is 
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an accounting sense, it may nonetheless be of material interest to 
a shareholder of the corporation in deciding whether to retain or 
dispose of his investment or in deciding how to cast his vote at a 
shareholders' meeting. 
The relevance of this latter test was established by the United 
States Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.66 
There, the court held that, for purposes of section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act which governs proxy solicitations,67 information is 
material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote."68 
Courts have repeatedly held that the existence of a substantial 
transaction with a corporation which is beneficial personally to an 
officer or director constitutes material information to the voting 
shareholder.69 This is so whether the vote being sought concerns 
presently no precise definition of its meaning that is accepted within the (accounting) 
profession for determining whether a given fact or circumstance is material." Peat 
Marwick & Mitchell, quoted in Jennings, Recker & Kneer, A Source of Insecurity: A Dis-
cussion and An Empirical Examination of Standards of Disclosure and Levels of Materi-
ality in Financial Statements, 10 J. CoRP. L. 639, 640 (1985). 
66. 426 u.s. 438 (1976). 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1981). 
68. 426 U.S. at 449. 
69. See, e.g., Kas v. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(fact that directors of subsidiary corporation about to be acquired in a cash-out merger 
also serve as legal counsel to management of acquiring company is material because this 
information "would in all probability have assumed actual significance in the deliberations 
of a reasonable shareholder [contemplating a vote to approve the merger]"); SEC v. Fal-
staff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 67-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980) 
(proxy statement seeking approval of a charter amendment is deficient when it fails to 
disclose the details of the benefits the controlling shareholder will receive if amendment is 
passed); Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., 540 F.2d 1266, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure of proxy 
solicitation to disclose the "true extent of the economic benefit" accruing to a director 
engaged in conflict of interest transactions with the corporation as well as failure to dis-
close the "concomitant cost to the corporation" of these transactions constitutes a material 
omission); Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 773-74 (3d Cir. 
1976) (fact that certain directors who had negotiated for themselves a cash-out in connec-
tion with a proposed merger, while seeking approval of a share exchange applicable to all 
other shareholders, were subject to "conflicting interests," was "obviously of material in-
terest" to the shareholders whose votes were being solicited); Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 
403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 396 U.S. 375 
(1970) (failure of proxy solicitation clearly to disclose potential personal benefit to board 
members advocating favorable vote on a proposed merger constitutes a material omission); 
Televest, Inc. v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 489 F. Supp. 250, 254 (E.D. Wis. 1980) 
(failure of proxy solicitation to inform shareholders that president and trustee of a real 
estate investment trust had a direct interest in the trust's property management company 
and was receiving a substantial proportion of the payments made to the property manage-
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approval for the transaction itself or merely election of a directo-
rial slate;70 whether the transaction involves criminal miscon-
duct71 or, as is more frequently the case, merely financial oppor-
tunism. The SEC regards the disclosure of managerial conflict of 
interest transactions so necessary to de:g1onstrate the presence or 
absence of management integrity and competency72 that it now 
expressly requires this information to be disclosed in annual 
proxy solicitations. 78 
ment company constitutes a material omission); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp~ 
44, 64-66 (D.N.J. 1974) (failure to disclose that corporate director, also serving as general 
counsel to corporation in connection with proposed sale of assets, is also a close business 
associate and investor in other enterprises with the principals of the acquiring corporation 
constitutes a material omission). See also cases collected in Block, Barton & Olah, Judi-
cial Limitations on Federal Disclosure Requirements Regarding Management Integrity, 
14 SEc. REG. L.J. 354, 359-60 n.29 (1987). 
But see Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978) (loans made by directors to 
corporation on exploitive terms might constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, but no issue is 
presented under federal securities laws); Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA 
Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1084 (2d Cir. 1977) (failure of corporation seeking approval of sale of 
assets to disclose conflict between the directors' interest as stockholders and the interests 
of debenture holders is solely a matter of state law fiduciary duties, not governed by the 
federal securities laws); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1144-46 (D. Or. 
1984) (relationship of investment banker, lawyers, and officer to corporation seeking ap-
proval of a leveraged buy-out held not to constitute a conflict of interest requiring disclo-
sure); Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 
1977) (since omissions concerning payments made to investment trust President, although 
material, do not make any statements made in a proxy statement false or misleading, Rule 
14a-9(a) was not violated); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (claim that the directors of a corporation resisting a tender offer were affiliated with 
target corporation's lending banks held not to constitute proof of a conflict of interest 
requiring disclosure); Lewis v. Dansker, 357 F. Supp. 636, 642-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (ninety 
percent shareholders are not required to disclose the tax benefits incurred by them per-
sonally as a result of corporate transactions, inasmuch as this information is not material); 
Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 709 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (director's relationship with 
investment banking firm representing proposed merger partner and with subsidiary of 
which proposed merger partner owns 700,000 shares both held to be too attenuated to be 
of material interest to shareholders). · 
70. See Perelman, 432 F. Supp. at 1303. 
71. See United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 649 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 
917 (1979) (failure to disclose corporate payment of "finder's fee" to a third party for 
services never performed, followed by substantial kickback to officers and director who 
arranged the payment, constitutes a material omission under section 17(a) of 1933 Act); 
SEC v. Kalvex Inc., 425 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (scheme involving payments 
to vendor followed by kickback to director/president was material and had to be disclosed 
in annual proxy solicitation for election of directors). 
72. For a thoughtful discussion of the parameters of this concept, see Ferrara, Starr & 
Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 
76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1981). 
73. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-101, Item 6(e), Instructions 1-2 (1987). 
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The theory behind requiring disclosure of managerial conflicts 
of interest has been variously stated by the courts. The Second 
Circuit has noted that "Since self-dealing presents opportunities 
for abuse of a corporate position of trust, the circumstances sur-
rounding corporate transactions in which directors have a per-
sonal interest are <:iirectly relevant to a determination of whether 
they are qualified to exercise stewardship of the company."7' An-
other court has observed, "One does not elect as a director an 
individual who is using the corporation he represents for personal 
gain."76 Yet a third court has added that "one does not elect as a 
trustee or director an individual who knows, or should know, that 
other directors or trustees are using the corporation for a personal 
gain and vote in favor of such transactions, or, raise no objection 
to such transactions. "76 
While these pronouncements may overstate the case,77 it is at 
least fair to say that reasonable shareholders might regard as a 
significant factor in their electoral decisions the existence of 
transactions in which a corporate officer or director (a) receives a 
substantial personal (or familial) benefit, (b) receives a substan-
tial proportion of the corporation's earnings whether or not the 
amount represents a substantial benefit to the director person-
ally, (c) enjoys opportunities to contract with the corporation dis-
proportionate to his position among competitors for those oppor-
tunities, or (d) may be the beneficiary of inadequate or 
indiscriminate corporate contracting practices. Any such transac-
tion, or a series of transactions permitting similar conclusions, 
would, under TSC, be of material interest to the voting 
shareholder. 
74. Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979). 
75. SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., supra note 71, 425 F. Supp. at 315. 
76. Perelman, 432 F. Supp. at 1303-04. 
77. Not all business transactions involving a corporation and one of its officers, directors 
or their family members are improper: 
An officer or director often may have something to exchange that would be ad· 
vantageous for the corporation to have. An example is unique property, the own· 
ership of which would facilitate the development of the corporation's business. 
More obviously, all officers and directors who receive compensation are provid· 
ing services that the corporation requires from someone at some price. If the 
duty of loyalty precluded such sales of goods or services by an officer or director, 
the corporation would be the loser and its interest would suffer. 
Hazard, Foreword to THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GoVERN· 
ANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1986) at X. 
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C. HUnacceptable Conflicts of Interest" 
Neither term-"conflict of interest transaction, or "material 
conflict of interest transaction "-necessarily describes a situation 
adverse to the corporation's best interests. There are some con-
flict of interest transactions, however, which are objectionable as 
a matter of public policy-transactions which no prudent exercise 
of business judgment can justify. They do not represent a unique 
opportunity to the corporation. They do not represent compensa-
tion for needed services. They may not reflect any "benefit, to 
the corporation at all and in a universe limited to arm's length 
bargaining among strangers, presumably such transactions would 
not occur. 
These transactions-here denominated "unacceptable" conflict 
of interest transactions-are surely includable in the universe of 
transactions which are material to non-management shareholders. 
It is these transactions especially to which any public policy re-
sponse to the phenomenon of conflict of interest transactions as a 
whole must be addressed. Thus, it is instructive to review those 
cases which have scrutinized transactions involving managerial 
conflicts of interest to determine if any consistent themes exist 
which will assist in identifying those transactions which are, as a 
matter of law, "unacceptable." Some general categories immedi-
ately become apparent. 
First are the "overreaching" or "unfairness" cases in which the 
consideration received by the corporation as a consequence of the 
conflict of interest transaction is grossly disproportionate to that 
which is given up. Examples include sales or rentals of property 
to an insider at grossly understated values,78 substantial loans re-
turning far less than could be earned by the corporation were it to 
have made alternative investments,79 and lease arrangements in 
which the corporation pays excessive rents to an insider for leased 
space.80 
78. Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908, 918-20 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 753 
F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1985); Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 
1955); Apicella v. PAF Corp., 17 Ohio App. 3d 245, 248, 479 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ohio App. 
1984). 
79. See Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 171, 174, 568 P.2d 
1069, 1072 (1977); Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. 154, 420 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Super. 1980). See 
also Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 346, 690 P.2d 1343, 1348-49 (1984) 
(excessive below market-rate loans made to president/majority shareholder constitutes a 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
80. See Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of America, 396 Mich. 453, 
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Second are the "temporal shift" cases in which a management 
insider induces the corporation to engage in a business transac-
tion which, even assuming it occurs at a reasonable price, is in-
consistent with and detrimental to the corporation's prior busi-
ness plan or current financial needs. The problem is not the 
terms of the transaction, but rather its timing. Examples include 
a director inducing a corporation to accelerate cash payments 
ahead of a previously anticipated payment schedule resulting in 
the impairment of the corporation's financial condition,81 direc-
tors inducing a cash-poor corporation to qffset accounts receiva-
ble from another entity owned by them against accounts payable 
to that entity, rather than collecting the receivables in cash,82 and 
an officer inducing his corporation to pay him back salary and 
repay a demand note with interest at a time when the corporation 
had no operating funds and had to obtain a bank loan in order to 
make the required payments.83 
Third, and most common, are the "misappropriation" cases in 
which a manager simply converts corporate property to his own 
use, with or without the assistance or knowledge of other mana-
gers. Examples include a corporate executive drawing checks on 
the corporate account for payment of his personal expenses or for 
purchase of equipment for his own unrelated business ventures8" 
or physically removing corporate assets for his personal or busi-
ness use.86 
241 N.W.2d 466 (Mich. 1976); Lash v. Lash Furniture Co. of Barre, Inc., 130 Vt. 517, 521-
22, 296 A.2d 207, 210-11 (1972) (corporation made substantial architectural improvements 
valued at $45,QOO to building it rented from controlling shareholder at excessive rate of 
rent). 
81. See Thrasher v. Thrasher, 27 Cal. App. 3d 23, 103 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620-21 (1972). 
82. See B&S Rigging & Erection, Inc. v. Wydella, 353 N.W.2d 163, 168 (Minn. App. 
1984). 
83. See Irwin v. West End Development Co., 481 F.2d 34, 40 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied sub nom. Vroom v. Irwin, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974). 
84. Mid-Continent Aggregate, Inc. v. Brandt, 499 So. 2d 1117 (La. Ct. App. 1986); In-
terlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 45 Wash. App. 502, 728 P.2d 597, 603 (Wash. 
App. 1986); Michalski v. State Bank & Trust (In re Taco Ed's, Inc.), 63 Bankr. 913 (N.D. 
Ohio 1986); Normat Indus., Inc. v. Carter, 477 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985); South-
east Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pieroni, 96 A.D.2d 745, 465 N.Y.S.2d 499 (A.D. 4th Dept. 
1983); Garner v. Pearson, 545 F. Supp. 549, 561-62 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Libco Corp. v. Ro-
land, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1140, 1144-45, 426 N.E.2d 309, 312-13 (Ill. App. 4th Diet. 1981). 
85. See Schachter v. Kulik, 96 A.D.2d 1038, 466 N.Y.S.2d 444 (A.D. 2d Dept. 1983); 
Planhouse, Inc. v. Breland & Farmer Designers, Inc., 412 So. 2d 1164 (Miss. 1982) (copying 
company plans and using them in competition with company after leaving it held to be 
violation of fiduciary duty); Emergency Patient Serve., Inc. v. Crisp, 602 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1980). See also Minnesota Valley County Club, Inc. v. Gill, 356 N.W.2d 356, 361 
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While these categories do not exhaust the field of unacceptable 
conflict of interest transactions, they do illustrate the sorts of cor-
porate transactions which courts have found unacceptable and 
which any well-developed public policy would seek to deter. As 
will be seen, different types of unacceptable conflict of interest 
transactions may respond to different deterrent approaches. 
III. ExiSTING DETERRENTS TO UNACCEPTABLE CoNFLICTS oF 
INTEREST 
Mechanisms already exist which arguably serve to deter unac-
ceptable conflicts of interest. These mechanisms, however, are of 
limited practical utility. 
A. IRS Disallowance of Deductions for Unreasonable 
Payments 
One primary mechanism of deterrence is that provided by en-
forcement of the Internal Revenue Code.86 Section 162(a)(3)87 of 
the Code specifically addresses the problem of excessive pay-
ments by a corporation for the rental of property. That section 
allows a deduction for "rentals or other payments required to be 
made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for pur-
poses of the trade or business, of property to which [the corporate 
taxpayer] ... has no equity."88 Under this provision the Service 
has on many occasions disallowed corporate deductions for exces-
sive payments made to shareholders, managers or their family 
members, or affiliates for rents and royalties.89 
(Minn. App. 1984) (director's pledge of corporate assets to secure personal loans unlawful); 
Mountain Top Youth Camp, Inc. v. Lyon, 202 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. App. 1974) (president's 
transfer of not-for-profit corporation's land to himself and his wife without authority or 
consideration held void). 
86. 26 u.s.c. §§ 1-9602 (1984). 
87. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982). 
88. Id. 
89. "Although the statute [§ 162] does not limit deductions for rental payments to a 
'reasonable' amount, the reasonableness of such payments must be explored to determine 
whether they are 'ordinary and necessary' and thereby properly deductible under § 162, or 
whether they are 'excessive.'" Harmon City, Inc. v. United States, 733 F.2d 1381, 1383 
(lOth Cir. 1984). Rental payments are presumed reasonable unless a close relationship ex-
ists between the lessor and lessee, in which case the court will try to determine what rent 
would have been paid in an arm's length transaction. Id. In Harmon, the court held rental 
payments to be excessive and nondeductible when a family-owned corporation engaged in 
a sale-leaseback transaction with a related family-owned partnership. Id. at 1385. For 
other cases disallowing deduction of rental payments, see, e.g., Milbrew, Inc. v. Comm'r, 
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Section 162(a)(1)90 addresses the consulting fee problem. Under 
this provision, a corporation is entitled to deduct a "reasonable 
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered. "91 The Service frequently has relied on this 
provision to disallow a business deduction claimed by a corpora-
tion for compensation paid to shareholders, or managers or their 
relatives for services purportedly but not in fact rendered, 92 or for 
services valued at arm's length at considerably less than the 
amount actually paid.93 Arguably the threat of deduction disal-
710 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1983); Miland Ford Tractor Co. v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 
1960); Utter-McKinley Mortuaries v. Comm'r, 225 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1955); Stanwick's, 
Inc. v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 556 (1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1951); Kamen Soap Prods. 
Co. v. Comm'r, 25 T.C.M. (P-H) 626 (1956); Floridan Hotel Operators, Inc. v. Comm'r, 22 
T.C.M. (P-H) 145 (1953); Manos Amusements, Inc. v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.M. (P-H) 652 
(1951) (corporation paid excessive rent for property owned by sole shareholder's wife). Cf. 
Velvet Horn, Inc. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 749, 754 (1981) (corporation's rent paid to a 
partnership comprised of the corporation's shareholders was deductible because the rent 
was reasonable); William E. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 571, 575 
(1981) (family-owned grocery corporation was allowed to deduct rent paid to family mem-
bers because the lease was entered into during an arm's length transaction). 
90. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1982). 
91. ld. 
92. See, e.g., Medina v. Comm'r, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 1026, 1036 (1983) (salary paid to 
majority stockholder's son was not deductible because the corporation failed to prove that 
the son actually rendered any services to the corporation); Morrison v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. 
(P-H) 2719, 2734-35 (1982) (compensation paid to sole shareholder's children was not de-
, ductible because the corporation failed to prove that the children actually performed any 
services for the corporation); Heim v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 581, 589-90 (1978) (pay-
ments made to shareholder's mother and to his girlfriend were not deductible because the 
recipients of these gifts had not rendered any services for the corporation); Berry v. 
Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 1184, 1192 (1964) (payments made to sole shareholder's wife 
were not deductible because the corporation could not prove when, if ever, she had ren-
dered services for the corporation); Duffey v. Lethert, 11 A.F.T.R.2d 1317, 1320 (D. Minn. 
1962) (salary paid to the sister of corporation's president was not deductible because the 
sister admitted that she pe_rformed no services during the months that she was paid). 
93. When compensation for services has not been determined by arm's length bargain-
ing, the Commissioner will scrutinize all the circumstances to ensure that the compensa-
tion is "reasonable," considering the following factors: the employee's qualifications, the 
nature of the work, compensation paid to comparable employee of other businesses, and 
the amount of any dividend distributions paid by the corporation. Barton-Gillet Co. v. 
Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 750, 759 (1970) (citing Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 
115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949)). Any compensation in excess of "reasonable" compensation is not 
deductible under I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1982). For cases holding that compensation paid to 
shareholders was excessive, and therefore not deductible, see Northlich, Stolley, Inc. v. 
United States, 368 F.2d 272, 278 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Barton-Gillet Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C.M. 
(P-H) at 758; Tele-ception of Winchester, Inc. v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (P-H) 1326, 1329 
(1967); Logan Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 809, 817-19 (1964). In other cases, 
it has been held that compensation paid to a shareholder's relatives was excessive. See, 
e.g., Proctor v. Comm'r, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 1617, 1640-42 (1981) (shareholder's mother re-
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lowance under these provisions deters corporations from making 
excessive payments to management shareholders or their family 
members in the guise of rental payments, "consulting contracts," 
or other personal service contracts. 
Corporate "loans" to managers have also run afoul of the Ser-
vice's enforcement powers, at least where the managers receiving 
the loans are also shareholders. Where corporate funds are 
'~loaned" to a shareholder but the Service finds by the surround-
ing circumstances that there was no intent to create a bona fide 
creditor-debtor relationship, the Service has treated these trans-
fers as constructive dividends taxable as current income to the 
shareholder. 94 
Some of the precise sorts of transactions disclosed in the SEC 
filings have specifically been disallowed by the Service under 
§ 162. For example, the Service has declined to permit corporate 
deductions for life insurance premiums paid by the corporation 
for policies the beneficiaries of which are the relatives of insured 
corporate executives.96 
ceived $14,500 for services reasonably valued at $2,652); Irving Levitt Co. v. Comm'r, 37 
T.C.M. (P-H) 613, 616-17 (1968) (shareholder's mother-in-law received $100 per week for 
services valued at $25 per week; shareholder's daughter received $175 per week for services 
valued at $35 per week). 
94. I.R.C. § 301 (1982). See, e.g., Busch v. Comm'r, 728 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1984) (sole 
shareholder of corporation withdrew $300,000 and tendered non-interest-bearing uncol-
lateralized notes; court found no contemporaneous intent to repay, and treated advances 
as constructive dividends); Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (court treated periodic withdrawals by sole shareholder cumu-
lating to $1,817,133 as constructive dividends); Oyster-Shell Prods. Corp. v. Comm'r, 313 
F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963) (shareholders of closely-held corporation found to have received 
constructive dividends notwithstanding corporate records reflecting their indebtedness); 
Lewis v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 2499 (1985); Rapoport v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 
205 (1983); Piekos v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 2662 (1982); Pizzarelli v. Comm'r, 40 
T.C.M. (CCH) 156 (1980); Smith v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 75 (1980); Mclemore v. 
Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (P-H) 259 (1974); Holman v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1973); 
Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 1324 (1971), aff'd without opinion, 496 F.2d 876 
(5th Cir. 1974); Chesapeake Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (P-H) 1406, 1415-16 (1964). 
Payment made to a family member of a shareholder can constitute a section 301 distribu-
tion by the corporation with respect to the stock of the shareholder. In proper circum-
stances it is appropriate to hold that a payment to a family member represents a distribu-
tion by the corporation to the shareholder for he enjoys the use of such property as much 
as if the corporation had distributed it directly to him. Morrison v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (P-
H) 2719, 2735 (1982). 
95. C{. NFC Leasing, Inc., supra note 22; Quidel, supra note 32; Champion Trophy Mfg. 
Corp. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 1291, 1298-99 (1972) (corporation was not allowed to 
deduct the cost of insuring the life of its president where beneficiary of the insurance 
policy was the president's son because the corporation had not formally authorized the 
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There are thus a variety of disincentives to unacceptable con-
flict of interest transactions present in the Code, but they are 
only effective to the extent that (1) corporate taxpayers claim de-
ductions and (2) the Service audits individual corporate returns 
and identifies disallowable expenditures. During taxable year 
1984, the Service audited only 58,947 corporate returns or less 
than 3% of the 1,465,800 which were filed.96 Moreover, the IRS 
deterrent would seem to address only the "overreaching" type of 
unacceptable conflict of interest trimsaction, and not the tempo-
ral shift or misappropriation types. 
B. Statutory Sterilization Procedures 
Forty states ·have now enacted so-called "safe-harbor stat-
utes"97 which, although adopted to foster self-dealing transac-
expenditure; the premiums were taxed as gross income to the president). Generally, how-
ever, the cost of life insurance premiums is considered additional compensation to the 
insured officer or employee, and is deductible by the corporation, if reasonable and neces-
sary, even though the beneficiary is a relative of the employee. Brown Agency, Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 21 B.T.A. 1111, 1113 (1931); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Comm'r, 16 B.T.A. 1307 (1929); 
Peerless Pacific Co. v. Comm'r, 10 B.T.A. 103, 106 (1928). But cf. Proctor v. Comm'r, 50 
T.C.M. (P-H) 1617, 1637 (1981) (corporation was not allowed deduction for the cost of 
medical insurance premiums paid for shareholder's brother who was not an employee of 
the corporation). See also Bongiovanni v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 575, 579-80 (1976), 
where the court disallowed a claimed deduction by a closely-held corporation of the cost of 
medical bills and nursing care for the mother of the shareholders. The money paid by the 
corporation was taxed to the shareholders as constructive dividends. 
96. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 1985 AN-
NUAL REPORT oF CoMMISSIONER AND CHIEF CouNSEL 60. 
97. ALA. CoDE § 10-2A-63 (1975); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1956); CAL. CoRP. CoDE 
§ 310 (West 1977); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-323 
(West 1987); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.124 (West 1977); 
GA. CoDE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1982); HAw. REv. STAT. § 415-41 (1985); IDAHO CoDE § 30-1-41 
(1980 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CoDE ANN. 
§ 23-1-35-2 (Burns 1986); IowA CoDE ANN.§ 496A.34 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-
6304 (1981); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.205 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 12:84 (West 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (1964); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns 
CoDE ANN. § 2-419 (1985); MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.2545 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 302A.255 (West 1985); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-413 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-
2040.01 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.140 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (1986); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-8 (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 713 (McKinney 1986); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (1982); N:D. CENT. CoDE § 10-19.1-51 (1985); OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 
1701.60 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1030 (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT.§ 57.265 
(1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-37.1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op. 1987); 
TENN. ConE ANN. § 48-1-816 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 1888 (1984); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 
13.1-691 (1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.435 (West Supp. 1987); W. VA. CoDE§ 31-
1-25 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West 1986); WYo. STAT. § 17-1-136.1 (1986). 
These statutes, and the cases interpreting them, have been the subject of much com-
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tions, have had the salutary effect of encouraging boards of direc-
tors to actively participate in any corporate decision to enter into 
a conflict of interest transaction. A paradigm of these statutes ap-
pears in the RMBCA, which permits conflict of interest transac-
tions, but only if one of the following procedures was observed: 
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's inter-
est were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a com-
mittee of the board of directors and the board of directors or 
committee authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; 
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's inter-
est were disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote 
and they authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; or 
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation."8 
In the drafts of the Principles of Corporate Governance (PCG) 
submitted to the American Law Institute in April, 1986, and 
April, 1987,99 the council of the ALI has advocated a similar ap-
proach to transactions in which corporate officers, directors or 
dominating shareholders are "interested." 
Under the ALI view, directors, "senior executives,11100 and 
"dominating shareholders,"101 when personally interested in a 
matter affecting the corporation,102 are obligated to "deal fairly" 
ment elsewhere. See Elfin, A Critique of Portions of the 1983 Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act, 28 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 865 (1984); Buxbaum, Conflict of Interest Statutes 
and the Need for a Demand on Directors in Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1122 
(1980); de La Garza, Conflict of Interest Transactions: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Directors Who Are Also Controlling Shareholders, 57 DEN. L.J . 609 (1980); Bulbulia & 
Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of 
Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NoTRE DAME LAw. 201 (1977); Larson, Corporate Conflicts of 
Interest Under the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 463 (1975); Note, 
When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Directors Be Fair and Reason-
able? An Analysis of Conflict of Interest Statutes, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 199 (1985); 
Note, Section 21-2040.01: Interested Director Transactions and Considerations of Fair-
ness, 58 NEB. L. REv. 909 (1979); Co~ment, The Voidability of Interested Director Con-
tracts Under the Kansas Corporation Code, 24 KAN. L. REv. 655 (1976); Note, Corpora-
tions, Fiduciaries and Conflicts of Interest, 36 LA. L. REV. 320 (1975); Note, "Interested 
Director's" Contracts-Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law and the 
"Fairness" Test, 41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 639 (1973). See generally Sommer, The Duty of 
Loyalty in the ALI's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 719, 720-24 
(1984). 
98. RMBCA § 8.31(a). 
99. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Drafts Nos. 5 and 7. 
100. See supra note 58. 
101. See supra note 59. 
102. As defined in Tentative Draft No.5, § 1.18, a personal interest exists where a direc-
tor or officer is a party to a transaction, "has a pecuniary interest in the transaction" or 
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with the corporation, and to take certain affirmative steps to en-
sure a "disinterested" review of the transaction.103 
A director, senior executive, or dominating shareholder of a cor-
poration who enters into a transaction with the corporation (other 
than the receipt of routine compensation) in . which he has a per-
sonal interest, is expected under the PCG to make full disclosure 
concerning both the nature of his conflict of interest104 and the 
details of the transaction100 to whatever "corporate deci-
. sionmaker"106 must authorize the transaction.107 In most cases, 
that decisionmaker will be the "disinterested" members of the 
board.108 
These self-executing provisions reflect a belief (and a judicially 
recognizable presumption) that reasonable disinterested directors 
serve as effective monitors-they would not approve business ar-
rangements favorable to their co-directors unless those arrange-
ments were at the same time affirmatively in the best interests of 
the corporation. Available empirical evidence of the extent of 
such transactions indicates, however, that these sterilization pro-
cedures, like IRS oversight, are an imperfect mechanism to pro-
tect minority shareholders from many unacceptable conflict of in-
terest transactions.l09 If the "safe-harbor" provisions were truly 
effective deterrents, companies would not feel compelled upon go-
ing public to announce not only the abandonment of longstanding 
conflict of interest relationships, but also the alteration of corpo-
rate policies which heretofore favored these questionable relation-
ships.110 Nor would one find the courts of the states which have 
enacted sterilization procedures continually called upon to review 
"has a financial or familial relationship" with a party to the transaction. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 1, Tent. Draft No. 5, § 1.18(a). A dominating shareholder is interested in a 
transaction only where he is a party to it. ld. § 1.18(b). · 
103. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Draft No.5,§ 5.02; Tent. Draft No.7,§ 5.10. 
104. ld., Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.02. "Disclosure concerning a conflict of interest" is de-
fined in Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.09(a), as disclosure of "material facts known to [the 
director, senior executive or dominating shareholder] concerning his conflict of interest." 
105. /d. "Disclosure concerning a transaction" is defined in Tentative Draft No. 5, § 
1.09(b), as disclosure of "material facts known to him concerning the transaction." 
106. Id. "Corporate decisionmaker" is defined in Tentative Draft No. 5, § 1.07, as the 
"corporate official or body with the authority to make a particular decision for the 
. corporation." 
107. Id., Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.02(a)(1). 
108. Defined by negative inference by referring to Tent. Draft No. 5, § 1.18, supra note 
102. 
109. See supra riote 96 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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disputes involving allegations of unacceptable conflicts of 
interest. 111 
There are several reasons for the ineffectiveness of the steriliza-
tion approach. In many cases, there may not be a "disinterested" 
quorum large enough to approve112 or suitable to consider a pro-
posed conflict of interest transaction. 113 In other cases, the board, 
111. See, e.g., Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126 (Wyo. 1985) (decision of directors to 
contract with service company wholly owned by them, resulting in loss to the corporation 
but substantial profit to the service company, plus sale of property to same directors at a 
loss to the selling corporation, constitute breaches of fiduciary duty to minority sharehold-
ers-Wyoming safe harbor statute in effect); Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 
908, 919-22 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1985) (corporation's grant of real 
estate purchase option at a grossly inadequate price to partnership made up primarily of 
the corporation's directors was not enforced-Louisiana statute in effect); Midwest Man-
agement Corp. v. Stephens, 353 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa 1984) (director and chairman of corpora-
tion who induced its board-and ultimately its shareholders-to invest essentially all cor-
porate assets into start-up broker-dealer venture promoted by his son without giving 
accurate disclosure of his role, breached his fiduciary duty and had to make up the 
loss-Iowa statute in effect); Apicella v. PAF Corp., 479 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) 
(corporation's grant of lease to enterprise wholly-owned by corporation's director and his 
family, for unreasonably low rental fees, constitutes breach of duty to minority share-
holder-Ohio statute in effect); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 742 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (defendant officer/directors who permitted corporation's employees to work 
without reimbursement for another corporation in which defendants were principals 
breached their fiduciary duty-Ohio statute in effect); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979) (directors of a mutual insurance company who agreed 
to resign their board positions en masse and cede control to the purchasers of a related 
company owned by one of them without consideration to the mutual failed to discharge 
their fiduciary duty-Iowa statute in effect); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 
582 P.2d 1136 (1978) (two directors' use of corporate funds to pay expenses rightfully 
incurred by another corporation of which they were the sole shareholders, plus personal 
expenses including insurance premiums and travel expenses held to constitute 
breach-Kansas statute in effect); Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 
171, 568 P.2d 1069 (1977) (three transactions by which corporation sold real estate to or 
for the benefit of its president/director at an extreme and unjustified discount held to be 
"patently unfair"-California statute in effect); Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton 
Life Ins. of America, 396 Mich. 453, 241 N.W.2d 466 (1976) (commercial lease signed by 
corporation with lessor wholly owned by lessee's principal shareholder, secretary and di-
rector with board approval notwithstanding serious corporate financial difficulties held 
void-Michigan statute in effect); Holi-Rest, Inc. v. Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517 (Iowa 1974) 
(use of corporate funds to repay personal indebtedness, purchase of supplies from vendor 
owned by corporate director, and director's excessive compensation all found to constitute 
breach of duty-Iowa statute in effect); Smith v. Robinson, 343 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1965) 
(directors who received kickbacks from construction contractor in guise of rental pay-
ments, even where disinterested directors had knowledge of and approved the payments, 
breached their fiduciary duty-North Carolina statute in effect). 
112. The ALI proposal would require at least two disinterested board members to vote 
in favor of a conflict of interest transaction before it would be entitled ~ a presumption of 
propriety. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Draft No. 5, § 1.10. 
113. Sometimes the sterilization procedures fail because courts construe the "disinter-
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although independent in an economic sense, may fail because of 
collegiality to apply the exacting competitive standards to the 
proposed transaction which it (presumably) would apply in non-
conflict of interest situations.11' In still other cases, unacceptable 
conflict of interest transactions may occur simply because the 
board has abused its control relationship and, confident that 
shareholders will "never know,"1u does not concern itself with 
traditional standards of fairness. While the sterilization approach 
may serve to deter unacceptable transactions when corporate 
managers act in good faith, it does nothing to deter or detect 
them when they do not. Moreover, even when disinterested direc-
tors do act in good faith, the sterilization procedures can only 
serve to inhibit the overreaching and temporal shift types of con-
flict of interest transactions. They do not address the problem of 
misappropriation. 
C. "Market" Deterrents 
Contractarian theorists assert that additional deterrents to un-
acceptable conflict of interest transactions are present in the form 
of market pressures on managers to act for the maximization of 
shareholder gain. According to this view, managers are themselves 
commodities, competing in a managerial labor market which de-
termines their value by the performance of their employing 
firm. 118 If these managers engage in unacceptable conflict of in-
est" requirement irrationally. See, e.g., Rocket Mining Corp. v. Gill, 25 Utah 2d 434, 483 
P.2d 897 (1971) (director whose family members would benefit from transfer of mineral 
lease rights held sufficiently "disinterested" to vote approval of the transfer). 
114. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Le-
gal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 83 (1985); Brudney, 
supra note 1, at 610-13, 622; Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on 
other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corpora-
tions, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125, 1154 (1976). Professor Conard has suggested that reliance on 
purportedly "disinterested" directors is misplaced and that de novo judicial review should 
be applied to all challenged conflict of interest transactions. Conard, Theses for a Corpo-
rate Reformation, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 259, 283-85 (1986). Note, however, that the very 
collegiality which leads to questionable judgments where managerial conflicts are con-
cerned, may also lead to stronger overall business leadership. Haft, Business Decisions by 
the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1981). 
115. See infra text accompanying notes 153-58. 
116. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments 
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 919 (1982) (hereinafter Fischel, The 
"Race to the Bottom" Revisited]; see generally Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: 
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. Riv. 1, 9 (1987); Fischel & Bradley, The 
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and 
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terest transactions (or permit their comanagers to do so), their 
personal worth in the marketplace will drop, making such trans-
actions unlikely to occur.117 Alternatively, if managers engage in 
unacceptable transactions and otherwise manage poorly and fail 
to maximize shareholder wealth, "the market for corporate con-
trol, particularly the merger and the tender offer, [will] provide a 
mechanism for displacing [them)."118 
Thus, according to contractarian theory, there are already in 
place in our economic marketplace "incentives [for] managers 
. . . to make business decisions in the best interest of sharehold-
ers"119 and disincentives to act in their own short-term interests 
by engaging in unacceptable conflict of interest transactions.120 
The possibility that managers will diverge from this ideal is ad-
dressed when the shareholder discounts the price he is willing to 
pay for his shares.121 
Initially, this construct seems to fall squarely within the 
"never-never world of neoclassicist economics, "122 at least as far 
as the shareholder's ability to negotiate a discounted purchase 
price is concerned. How would such negotiation take place? It is 
possible in the context of an underwritten public offering that the 
underwriter would, in effect, conduct this negotiation. Both the 
pricing of the issue and the terms of the underwriting agreement 
would reflect market apprehension over the prospect that the is-
suer's managers, for any number of reasons including potential 
conflicts of interest, would fail to maximize shareholder wealth. It 
is more difficult to conceive of a comparable negotiating opportu-
Empirical Analysis, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 261, 267 (1986); Baysinger & Butler, Race for the 
Bottom v. Climb to the Top: ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CoRP. L. 
431, 448-51 (1985); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 
1263-65 (1982) [hereinafter Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement]. 
117. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited, supra note 116, at 919; R. WINTER, 
GovERNMENT AND THE CoRPORATION 25 (1978). Cf. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and 
Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 540, 544 (1984). 
118. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited, supra note 116, at 919. 
119. /d. at 922. 
120. This theory, if valid, would seem to deter with equal effectiveness all three types of 
unacceptable conflict of interest transactions-those involving overreaching, temporal 
shift and misappropriation. 
121. Fishel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited, supra note 116, at 918. Cf. Scott, 
Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 927, 938 (1983). 
122. Ackerman, Law, Economics and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1987 DuKE L. REv. 
929, 935. 
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nity in the context of non-public offerings.123 
Equally suspect is the concept that managers engage in self-. 
policing in order to enhance their value in a market for manage-
rial employment.1u Self-dealers cannot be assumed to aspire to 
job mobility, and it is unrealistic in many business situations to 
believe that amorphous "market pressures" will contain the op-
portunistic instincts of managers in a position to indulge them 
undetected. 
It may be that these theories work in the rarified world of pub-
licly-held corporations whose activities (and public filings with 
the SEC and other regulatory agencies) are routinely scrutinized 
by market analysts. Among the less actively traded ventures, 
however, which make up the overwhelming majority of American 
business corporations, 12~ the evidence does not support the con-
123. Assume, for example, that a potential investor is approached to invest in a business 
venture-say in an intrastate or a Regulation D offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1982); 
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1987). Depending on the state and the circumstances under 
which the offer occurs, he may be entitled to basic information concerning the offeror and 
its managers, but practically speaking, if it is an attractive offer, he is not going to be 
given any additional opportunity to negotiate special purchase terms in order to accommo-
date his aversion to conflicts of interest. Rather, he will be offered the opportunity to 
participate at the stated price, or to forfeit that opportunity. A real-world purchaser is 
unlikely to articulate the proposition that "based on the disclosures you have provided me, 
I think there is a 15% chance these managers are going to engage in self-dealing or other-
wise be deficient in terms of managerial integrity or competence. Accordingly, I will 
purchase your shares if you grant me a 15% discount." Moreover, even assuming price 
negotiation on the basis of anticipated conflicts of interest is feasible, the far more likely 
scenario will find the purchaser with no material information about the likelihood that the 
offeror's managers will engage in conflict of interest transactions. Unless substantial dis-
closure is made, the purchaser will have no basis upon which to make even an initial deter-
mination that corporate managers are potential self-dealers, let alone to quantify his bar-
gaining position. E.g., Warren, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The Role of Merit 
Regulation, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 129, 137 (1987) ("[U]nlike institutions and most 'accred-
ited' investors, many individual investors lack the information and experience to compare 
different types of offerings, have no negotiating leverage, and rely extensively on securities 
salesmen eager to confirm sales."). Cf. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, 
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1412-16, 1420 (1985). 
As has been suggested in the field of insider trading, "[t]he contract analogy simply fails 
to offer a workable format because its central condition-a capability on the part of the 
parties to reliably estimate their respective costs and benefits-cannot be satisfied . . . . " 
Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School," 1986 
DuKE L.J. 628, 655. 
124. This process necessarily involves a risk assessment. Where the perceived gain from 
a conflict transaction exceeds the perceived diminution or risk of diminution in the in-
sider's "market value," the. insider will succumb to opportunism. See Fischel & Bradley, 
supra note 116, at 266 ("Poor performance [or self-dealing] is a rational strategy if the 
present gains exceed the present value of future costs."). 
125. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text. 
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tractarian model. A perusal of virtually any of the decided cases 
finding "unacceptable conflict of interest" transactions involving 
such corporations126 suggests that forces different from those con-
templated within a market for managerial labor are at work. Ex-
ecutives of these companies are not competitors in the market for 
managerial labor, but people trying to keep (and if possible to 
exploit) the jobs they currently possess. The mechanism of poten-
tial displacement is not the merger or the tender offer, but rather 
bankruptcy and impending unemployment, and perhaps local dis-
grace. The operative incentives in these frequently marginal oper-
ations encourage, rather than discourage managerial over-
reaching. 127 
Even in publicly-traded corporations, managerial conflicts of 
interest usually involve sums too small to activate the hypothe-
126. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
127. Cf. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 
25 UCLA L. REv. 738, 748 (1978) (Managers in non-public corporations "have unusually 
great opportunities to cheat without detection and [consequently) they have unusually 
great incentives to do so."). 
Two examples from the cases should illustrate the point. Washington National Trust 
Co. v. W. M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz. 171, 568 P.2d 1069 (1977), involved a closely-held com-
pany substantially controlled by its majority shareholders/directors, Mr. and Mrs. Dary. 
Through their efforts, the company engaged in a series of real estate transactions each of 
which was later found by the court to constitute an unacceptable conflict of interest on the 
Dary's part. First, the Dary's induced the corporation to sell them a valuable tract of land 
in exchange for an unsecured promissory note for $85,000 at 6% interest. /d . at 173, 568 
P.2d at 1071. The company thereafter sold another tract to a third party for $150,000, of 
which $140,000 was transferred to the Dary's rather than being retained by the company. 
In return, the Dary's tendered an unsecured note for $135,000 at 4% interest. /d. Finally, 
the company deeded another tract of land to Mr. Dary for no consideration. 
A second illustrative case is Cattafi v. O'Neill (In re Nuisance Corp.), 17 Bankr. 80 
(D.N.J. 1981), a case (not uncharacteristically) heard in bankruptcy court. There, a group 
of officer/directors purchased a judgment from the corporation's judgment creditor at a 
discount, then converted the judgment into a security interest in the corporation's assets, 
enabling them to collect the entire debt to the exclusion of minority shareholders. 
While the facts in these cases may be mundane, each represents a paradigmatical unac-
ceptable conflict of interest transaction-in neither case were the managers' actions fur-
tive, such as would be the case where managers .engage in direct misappropriation or con-
version. In both cases, rather, the opportunistic conduct was known to co-managers and 
corporate employees who failed to act. The contractarian literature would suggest that 
subordinate corporate employees would serve as a monitor of such misconduct. Fama, 
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 228, 293 (1980). 
In both cases the managers' actions were carefully orchestrated. Contrary to the con-
tractarian vision, these managers did not have in mind maximizing shareholder wealth or 
supporting a high share price. Rather, what they had in mind was quick personal profit in 
total disregard for the long-term expense to other shareholders. Presumably, they felt in-
sulated against future market repercussions. 
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sized market forces. 128 Nonetheless, there is some evidence that 
market forces serve to deter at least egregious conflict of interest 
transactions in this limited corporate universe. Admittedly, there 
are few litigated cases finding a challenged conflict of interest 
transaction unacceptable as respects a widely-traded company!29 
If the contractarian model has validity, it can only be in a mar-
ket where information concerning past and potential conduct im-
plicating unacceptable conflicts of interest is available to share-
holders!80 As will be seen presently, most business ventures do 
not operate in such a market. Moreover, the model can only serve 
as a deterrent where the firm is sufficiently desirable to attract 
predators for whom the benefits of a tender offer or merger out-
weigh the disruptions inherent in such a transaction.181 
In short, market forces are merely derivative of the information 
gathering and dissemination process. If information concerning 
executive conflicts is not effectively conveyed to the marketplace, 
the predictable and arguably deterrent market responses to that 
128. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 187, 204 (1983) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate 
Law]; Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Modernizing Corporate Law, 9 
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 626, 627 (1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments]. 
See generally Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 582, 593-97 (1985) [hereinafter Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse]. 
129. The business press can be counted upon to publicize truly audacious executive con-
flicts, pinpointing the offender and compromising his value in the market for managerial 
labor. The more "public" the enterprise, the greater the likelihood that the press, and/or 
critical market analysts will serve this role, which magnifies the effectiveness of whatever 
self-limiting market forces may exist. 
130. It is not necessarily true that this information will be reflected in the price of the 
corporation's shares. See generally Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly In-
formation and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 764-65, 841-46 (1985). 
131. Scott, supra note 121, at 939 ("Proxy contests and takeover bids are risky and 
expensive, attributes which the SEC seems intent on increasing still further. As a result 
the gains from ousting self-rewarding management must become quite sizeable before they 
outweigh the costs. Furthermore, by taking rewards in less visible forms (e.g., self-dealing 
transactions, insider trading, or appropriated corporate opportunities), management can 
increase investigation costs and information uncertainties for any potential acquirer and 
hence move still further out the bound on management rents set by the corporate control 
market."). C{. Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse, supra note 128, at 582-83 ("The disci-
pline of the market for corporate control is limited by a number of elements, including the 
high transaction costs of takeover bids, the necessity to offer a premium well in excess of 
market price, the requirements of relevant statutes, the defensive techniques available, the 
incentives to take over efficiently run as well as inefficiently run companies, and the time 
lag often experienced by potential acquirors in ascertaining lack of managerial 
efficiency."). 
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conduct cannot occur.132 
D. Mandatory Disclosure 
Consistent with the prescription of Louis D. Brandeis that 
"sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the best police-
man,"133 commentators for years have regarded mandatory corpo-
rate disclosure as a means of deterring unacceptable conflict of 
interest transactions. During his tenure as a law professor, Wil-
liam 0. Douglas observed that: 
[P]ublicity alone can accomplish much-not publicity in the 
sense of a registration in some dusty file in Washington or in 
some state capitol, but publicly in the sense of direct and une-
quivocal statement in the periodical reports to stockholders 
.... That simple expedient will go far as a corrective of condi-
tions which have been constantly recurring in our corporate his-
tory. Its prophylactic effects will equal in importance any other 
single measure which can be adopted. 134 
More recently, some critics have come to disparage reliance on 
this "confessional" system of disclosure.13~ They suggest that 
mandatory disclosure at best raises the "embarrassment cost" in-
curred by a corporation and its managers, but does not signifi-
cantly deter managerial misconduct. 138 
The SEC, embracing the Douglas view, requires that corpora-
tions subject to its reporting requirements annually disclose all 
132. As Professor Dooley has pointed out, "the market mechanisms might . . . be better 
at disciplining opportunistic behavior if we had mechanisms to bring conflicts of interest 
to public attention. If so, there is always the possibility that we would be better off redi-
recting the focus of conflict of interest laws away from deterrence and punishment to rules 
that are more clearly designed to force disclosure about the existence of such conflicts." 
Schwartz, Clark & Dooley, Genesis: Panel Response, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 687, 697 (1987). 
133. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914). C{. Frankfurter, Securities Act: 
Social Consequences, FoRTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55 ("The existence of bonuses, of excessive 
commissions and salaries, of preferential lists and the like, may all be open secrets among 
the knowing, but the knowing are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to 
force knowledge of them into the open is largely to restrain their happening."). 
134. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1323 (1934). 
135. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate 
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REv. 1099, 1265 (1977). 
136. Id. at 1264. The effectiveness of mandatory disclosure as a deterrent to corporate 
misdeeds has generated much scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 693 (1984); 
Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 
VA. L. REv. 717 (1984); Seligman·, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclo-
sure System, 9 J . CoRP. L. 1 (1983). 
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conflict of interest transactions in excess of $60,000.137 A signifi-
cant limitation of this requirement is the fact that it covers so few 
business entities. Only 12,450 corporations are currently subject 
to SEC oversight.188 For the majority of corporations which are 
not subject to SEC oversight, 139 with one narrow exception, 140 
mandatory disclosure does not provide shareholders with any ef-
fective notice of, and so cannot effectively deter, unacceptable 
conflict of interest transactions. 
As an initial proposition, a corporation's obligation to disclose 
information concerning management conflicts of interest depends 
on its state of incorporation. Each state's corporate regulatory 
statutes contain "access" provisions specifying the information to 
which shareholders of domiciliary corporations are entitled. While 
to some it "seems self-evident that shareholders should be ade-
quately informed about . . . material conflict of interest transac-
tions between the corporation and its managers,"141 only one st~te 
requires such disclosure.142 
A handful of states require that domiciliary corporations dis-
seminate basic financial information-generally, the most recent 
financial statement and balance sheet-to all shareholders within 
a short period of time following the close of each fiscal year.143 
This is the approach adopted in the Revised Business Model Cor-
poration Act (RMBCA).144 The majority of states require disclo-
sure of comparable financial information but only upon written 
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
138. Directory of Companies Required to File Annual Reports with the SEC Under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Sept. 30, 1986. 
139. In 1983, there were a total of 2,999,000 U.S. corporations. U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (107th ed. 1987). 
140. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
141. Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law, supra note 128, at 196. 
142. This state is California. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
143. ALA. CooE § 10-2A-79(e) (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-127 (1956); CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. § 33-334(a) (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.157(7); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
450.1901 (West 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1318 
(1967). 
144. The RMBCA requires that shareholders be sent within 120 days of the close of a 
corporation's fiscal year an annual financial statement, which includes a balance sheet as 
of the end of the fiscal year, an income statement for the year and a statement of changes 
in shareholders' equity for the year unless that information appears elsewhere in the 
materials. RMBCA § 16.20. They also are to receive specific notice of any shares issued for 
promissory notes or for promises to render services in the future, and of any indemnifica-
tion payments made to a director. /d. § 16.21. These rights to affirmative disclosure are in 
addition to the shareholders' right to initiate an inspection of the accounting records of 
the corporation, or other records concerning the directors' activities. /d. § 16.02. 
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shareholder request. 1411 Several states impose no requirement that 
a corporation make financial disclosure but permit shareholders 
access to corporate information based upon the statutory right to 
inspect or examine corporate books and records. 146 In some states 
even that right is limited to those shareholders who can satisfy 
certain threshold requirements of percentage ownership or owner-
ship duration.147 None of these states require their domiciliary 
corporations as a matter of course to disclose the existence of con-
flict of interest transactions. 
Only California requires annual disclosure to shareholders of 
managerial conflict of interest transactions. In its Annual Report 
. to Shareholders, 148 a California corporation must disclose any 
145. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-312 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 7-5-117 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-2-112(£) (1982); Hawaii; IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 30-1-52 (1980 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 32, paa. 7.75 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IowA CoDE ANN. § 496A.47 (West Supp. 1986); 
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.260 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 
130A, § 626 (1964); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.1487 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
302A.463 (West 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 21-2050 
(1943); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:52 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-28 (West 
Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 624 (McKinney 1986); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 10-19.1-85 
(1985); OHIO § 1701.38; OR. REV. STAT. § 57.246 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-46 (1956); 
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 33-11-250 (Law Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-4-29 (1983); 
TEXAS § 2.44; UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-47 (1953); UT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1896 (1984); 
WASH. REV. CoDE ANN.§ 23A.08.500 (West Supp. 1987); W.VA. CoDE § 31-1-105 (1982); 
Wvo. STAT.§ 17-1-144 (Supp. 1986). • 
This formulation may be traced to section 46 of the original Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (MBCA), adopted by the Section on Business and Banking Law of the American 
Bar Association in 1950. Section 46 remained in this form in the 1969 revision of the 
MBCA and was renumbered § 52. 
146. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.240 (1985); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); D.C. CoDE 
ANN. § 29-224 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-6510(b) (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12.103(d) 
(West Supp. 1986); MD. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 2-512 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
351.215 (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78-105 (Michie 1986); N .C. GEN. 
STAT. § 55-38 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.43 (West Supp. 1986). 
147. Such statutes can lead to absurd results. See, e.g., Caspary v. Louisiana Land & 
Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1983), aff'g 560 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1983) (share-
holder who had invested approximately $3 million in a corporation incorporated in Mary-
land was not afforded access to shareholders' list in the midst of a proxy fight because his 
holdings represented only .3% of the outstanding shares and the Maryland access statute 
required 5% ownership for at least six months in advance of the request. Comment, Cas-
pary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.-The Common Law Right to Inspect Corporate 
Recor.ds for Proper Purpose, 43 MD. L. REv. 572 (1984). 
148. The California General Corporation Law provides that the board of directors of a 
California corporation ~ust circulate to the shareholders within 120 days of the end of the 
fiscal year and at least 15 days prior to the shareholders' meeting an annual report con-
taining a balance sheet as of the end of the fiscal year, plus an income statement and a 
statement of changes in financial position for that fiscal year. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 1501(a) 
(West Supp. 1987). 
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transaction (other than routine compensation or those involving 
competitive bids) during the preceding fiscal year involving an 
amount in excess of $40,000 to which the corporation was a party 
and in which any director or officer or any holder of more than 
10% of the outstanding voting shares of the corporation had a 
direct or indirect material interest. 149 Where such transactions 
have occurred, the corporation's report must name the person and 
identify his relationship to the corporation, the nature of his in-
terest in the transaction and, where practicable, the amount of his 
interest.11~° California law, however, exempts from this provision 
corporations with less than 100 shareholders, 151 and corporations 
which are subject to SEC oversight.152 
Thus, from a total universe of approximately three million do-
mestic corporations/53 only 12,450 are subject to the SEC's dis-
closure requirements and 8,000 more to California's.154 Further 
subtracting the truly closely-held corporations (in which the fa-
miliarity among investors arguably would afford them at le~st 
constructive notice of transactions or business relationships in-
volving management conflicts of interest), 155 approximately 
160,000 corporations remain which have significant public owner-
ship but no obligation to provide information concerning conflict 
of interest transactions.156 This is so even where the information 
is, in the TSC sense, material to investors, 157 or where managerial 
149. Id. § 1501(b)(1). In addition, the annual report for most California corporations 
must also describe any indemnification payments aggregating more than $10,000 made to 
officers or directors of the corporation. Id. § 1501(b)(2). 
150. Id. § 1501(b)(1). 
151. ld. § 1501(b). 
152. Id. § 1501(b)(1). 
153. See supra note 139. 
1&4. At year end 1985, California had 416,700 corporations in good standing with the 
Secretary of State (letter from Office of Secretary of State, on file with the Rutgers Law 
Review). Eisenberg estimates that those with 100 or more shareholders represent 2% of 
this total. M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 39·. Using this estimate and rounding downward 
to account for some duplication with the SEC companies, there are roughly 8,000 Califor-
nia corporations disclosing conflict of interest transactions to their shareholders. 
155. Eisenberg estimates closely-held entities (defined conservatively as having 10 or 
less shareholders) to represent 94% of all corporations, so for purposes of this exercise 
delete 2,820,000. M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 39, 42. 
156. See Knauss, The Problems of Smaller Public Corporations, in CoMMENTARIES ON 
CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 141, 144 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) ("It is for this 
group of companies-those that are not close corporations but that do not have publicly-
traded securities-that the procedural and organizational state corporation laws are most 
needed."). 
157. 426 U.S. at 449. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
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conduct, in the sense recognizable m court, has been 
unacceptable. 
\ 
The result in these cases is that a corporation may take its 
chances with the IRS audit lottery, and its directors may either 
fail to conduct a sterilization review or disregard their fiduciary 
duties while doing so (not to mention disregarding the applicable 
"market pressures"), and the shareholders will never know what 
has occurred. · 
Whatever the merits of mandatory disclosure/58 there is no 
question that the existing mandatory disclosure system serves no 
deterrent function for the many business entities to which it cur-
rently does not apply. The harder question, of course, is whether 
mandatory disclosure serves as an effective deterrent in those 
companies to which disclosure rules do apply. While the commen-
tators have decried the lack of "scientifically acceptable evi-
dence" on this subject, ue there are indicators which suggest that 
mandatory disclosure does serve a deterrent function, albeit im-
perfectly. It is certainly possible, for example, to point to situa-
tions in which questionable, if not unacceptable, conflict of inter-
est transactions have occurred in companies not only subject to 
SEC oversight but also totally in compliance with SEC disclosure 
rules.160 
158. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. 
159. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 136, at 693. 
160. Several representative transactions may be cited. The business press has recently 
castigated the Diamond Shamrock Corporation, "an energy conglomerate with large, per-
sistent losses," for its investment through a subsidiary in a biotechnology company par-
tially owned by a Diamond director. The Downfall of a CEO-The Inside Story of Bill 
Bricker's Reign at Diamond Shamrock, Bus. WK., Feb. 16, 1987, at 76. After the director's 
outstanding loans to the biotechnology company had been repaid allegedly out of the pro-
ceeds of Diamond's investment, Diamond abandoned the venture. /d. The entire series of 
transactions was duly disclosed in Diamond's SEC filings. /d. See DIAMOND SHAMROCK 
CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT 8 (Mar. 7, 1986). 
Horn & Hardart, a food service conglomerate with substantial losses in 1986, paid $1.2 
million over three years to a company owned by its chairman for the use of two corporate 
jets. Why Didn't They Pay Him to Stay Home?, FoRBES, June 15, 1987, at 120-21. The 
payments were disclosed in Horn & Hardart's annual SEC filing. See HoRN & HARDART, 
INC., PROXY STATEMENT 11 (1987). 
Mobil Oil chairman William Tavoulareas in 1979 responded to press criticisms of Mo-
bil's multimillion dollar dealings with a London shipping concern in which Tavoulareas' 
son was a principal, pointing out that contemporaneous SEC reporting requirements ap-
plied to. transactions between related persons ''only if they resided under the same roof. 
Otherwise, no reporting was necessary at all." W. TAVOULAREAS, FIGHTING BACK 136 (1985). 
(The relationship between Mobil and the London shipping concern was later characterized 
by the court which adjudicated Tavoulareas' libel claim arising out of the incident as 
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A comparison of the conflict of interest experiences of pre-pub-
lic companies (which generally are not subject to mandatory dis-
closure requirements) and public companies (which are) suggests 
a number of answers to the question "is mandatory disclosure an 
effective deterrent?" Referring back to Figure 1, mandatory dis-
closure requirements seem to have little, if any, impact on the 
willingness of a corporation to rent or purchase property or 
equipment from its managers. This may be due to the benefits of 
leasing, rather than owning, real estate.161 It may also be because 
the valuation of real or personal property is seen as systematic 
and concrete. So long as a reporting company can point to an ap-
praisal or comparable valuations of the property interest being 
acquired, or at least can argue that it needs a facility and this 
particular one was available at a reasonable price, the corporation 
is not likely to be deterred by the prospect of mandatory disclo-
sure from entering into a lease or purchase acquisition from its 
managers. 162 
The same may not be true of corporate loans made to directors, 
officers, their family members, or affiliates. Here, investor skepti-
cism comes into play more instinctively than in the case of prop-
erty acquisitions, because that which is received from the corpo-
rate manager-a promise of future repayment-is of less 
immediate and concrete value to the corporation than a building 
or a computer system. Valuation is more difficult as well. Where a 
"[abundant] with ... evidence of nepotism in favor of [the son]." Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 
F.2d 762, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 200 (1987).) 
Allegheny International induced former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to 
join its board of directors by offering him not only director's fees, but also a consulting 
contract to provide the company with "advice ' in the area of safety and protection devices' 
at $50,000 for no more than five days [sic] work per year." Symonds, supra note 5, at 60. 
The arrangement was disclosed in the company's 1984 Form 10-K. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 
Form 10-K, filed Jan. 30, 1984, Exhibit lOb. (This and a number of other conflict transac-
tions involving Allegheny insiders, however, were not disclosed in Allegheny's proxy solici-
tations, in violation of SEC guidelines. See ALLEGHENY INT'L, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 11, 
(Mar. 28, 1985); SEC v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., Litigation Release No. 11533, Sept. 9, 1987; 
Allegheny International Sued by SEC, supra note 10, at 10.) 
161. Note, Sales-Leaseback u. Mere Financing: Lyon's Roar and the Aftermath, 1982 
U. ILL. L. REv. 1075, 1079-80 (1982); STAFF OF JoiNT CoMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CoNG., 2D 
SESS., ANALYSIS OF SAFE-HARBOR LEASING 2-4, reprinted in 1982 Fed. Taxes Rep. Bull. (P-
H) 27 (1982). 
162. Cf. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance 
Project, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 19 (1984) ("The transactions that kindle duty of loyalty 
lawsuits usually do not involve property or services with readily · ascertainable market 
prices." (footnote omitted)). Scott, supra note 121, at 939 ("Most cases involve goods or 
services that are not fungible and for which no trading market price is available."). 
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corporation rents its headquarters from a partnership made up of 
the chairman of the board and his brother-in-law, a lender or in-
vestor can "see" whether the company is getting its money's 
worth. However, where a corporation allocates $200,000 of its as-
sets to a director to enable her to exercise outstanding stock op-
tions, repayable at 4%, ·it is far more difficult for an investor to 
know whether the value of resultant director loyalty and grati-
tude outweighs opportunity costs. Hence, in the case of a prop-
erty acquisition, the consideration provided by the insider is ap-
parent; in the case of a loan, the consideration is less so. These 
factors may explain the results in Figure 1, which suggest that 
corporations are deterred from making certain loans by the exis-
tence of a mandatory disclosure requirement. 
There is another equally plausible explanation, however. The 
disparity in loan-making behavior between pre-public and public 
companies may be explained on the basis of corporate "matur-
ity"-that is, the public corporations, having advanced beyond 
the pre-public stage, are more likely to attract "professional" 
managers who are less in need of direct financial support from 
the corporations which they serve than may be the case in start-
up companies. These managers may (and frequently do) receive 
more sophisticated forms of compensation than direct cash 
loans.163 If this is the case, then the disparity between the loan-
making behavior of the pre-public and public companies may not 
be attributable to the existence of a mandatory disclosure re-
quirement, but rather to the stage in the life-cycle of the compa-
nies in question. 
These same factors may explain the results in Figure 1 with 
respect to directorial consulting agreements and miscellaneous 
conflict of interest transactions. In each case, the pre-public com-
panies engaged in pr-oportionately more such transactions than 
did public companies. In the case of consulting agreements, the 
disparity was substantial; in the case of other transactions it was 
less so. Again these differences may be explained either by the 
existence of disclosure obligations or by the corporate maturity 
factor discussed above. In the case of mature corporations, their 
wider resources may render resort to insider consulting agree-
ments or other self-dealing transactions unnecessary. If so, the 
163. See, e.g., HEWITT AssoCIATES, HIGHLIGHTS OF CoMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR 
OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN THE FORTUNE 100 INDUSTRIALS (Sept. 1987). 
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existence of a mandatory disclosure requirement may be irrele-
vant to a corporation's choice of vendors. Mature corporations 
may choose non-insider vendors over insider-vendors not because 
a disclosure requirement encourages them to do so but because, 
unlike pre-public corporations, they have the experience and con-
fidence to do so. They are more likely than pre-public companies 
to have formalized purchasing protocols. In addition, they are not 
as restricted as pre-public companies are likely to be with respect 
to geographic limitations on contracting. 
In short, the evidence suggests, but hardly proves, that the im-
position of mandatory disclosure requirements on publicly-held 
corporations may indeed deter them from engaging in certain ma-
terial conflict of interest transactions. The deterrent effect may 
differ among types of conflict of interest transactions. 184 
For the present-based upon available anecdotal evidence and 
abiding further research-one may assume at least that 
mandatory disclosure (either alone or in connection with the mar-
ket forces which are activated thereby) plays a role in limiting 
unacceptable conflict of interest transactions. That it does so im-
perfectly can be attributed to obfuscatory drafting, shareholder 
passivity, 18~ and non-compliance for which inadequate disincen-
tives exist. 188 
164. What the evidence does not reveal, and what remains to be demonstrated by "sci-
entifically acceptable" proof is whether mandatory disclosure requirements effectively de-
ter unacceptable conflict of interest transactions or, based upon the phenomenon of "em-
barrassment costs" or otherwise, merely deter material conflict of interest transactions 
which would, if undertaken, be benign or affirmatively beneficial to the corporation. 
165. See, e.g., H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CoRPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH 
OF A PuRPOSE 27 (1979); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, supra note 116, at 
1274-75. 
166. Although judicial rhetoric encourages creativity in remedying inadequate disclo-
sure, J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964); In re Caesar's Palace, 360 F. Supp. 
366, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), courts in fact have approached remediation very cautiously. 
Remedies for inadequate disclosures in proxy statements typically involve resolicitation 
with curative disclosure. Gladwin v. Medfield, 540 F.2d 1266, 1270, 1271 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(affirming trial court's order of a new election preceded by appropriate disclosure, where 
corporation had failed to disclose director's self-dealing); Lebhar Friedman, Inc. v. Movie-
lab, Inc., [1987 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 93,162, at 95,739 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (enjoining shareholders' meeting and ordering resolicitation where proxy statement 
failed to disclose adverse material information concerning directors seeking reelection); 
Telvest, Inc. v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 489 F. Supp. 250, 254, 255 (E.D. Wis. 
1980) (proxy statements of both management and insurgents voided and resolicitation or-
dered where management failed to disclose the half-million dollar conflict of interest of 
one of the trustees); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 659, 663 (D. Del. 1980) 
(election set aside and resolicitation ordered where insurgent group failed to disclose con-
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E. Liability Rules 
There is another possible deterrent to unacceptable conflict of 
interest transactions-the manager's fear of personal liability to 
shareholders in a derivative suit claiming corporate waste and di-
version of funds.187 Litigation may address one or all forms of 
conflict of interest transactions-overreaching, temporal shift, or 
misappropriation. A manager's fear that liability rules may apply 
to him, however, is illusory in all but the most egregious cases.168 
First, where disclosure of conflict of interest transactions is not 
required, shareholders, wholly in the dark as to the existence of 
such transactions, are unlikely to challenge them in court. Where 
shareholders do come into possession of information necessary to 
generate litigation, the existence of statutory safe harbor provi-
sions, or in their absence, the common law "intrinsic fairness" de-
fenses, together with the onerous burden of proof imposed on 
plaintiffs in such cases, 169 frequently render the shareholder's 
likelihood of success very small.170 Even where the cost-sharing 
flicts and management group likewise failed to disclose material information). 
Compensatory damages are regarded as incalculable, Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 
513, aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), and punitive 
damages are not authorized. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (limiting damage awards in actions 
under Securities and Exchange Act to "actual damages"). No court has held that a direc-
tor who sanctions the withholding from shareholders of material information concerning 
his conflicts of interest should be disqualified from serving. 
167. Professor Schwartz asserts, based upon personal experience, that "the plausible 
threat of a shareholder suit has influenced the terms of many [self-dealing] transactions 
and discouraged others from being undertaken." Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: 
A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 322, 
331 (1985). Even Professors Fischel and Bradley concede that "the spectre of civil liability 
(and/or imposition of criminal penalties) is probably a useful deterrent [but only] to large 
one-shot frauds." Fischel & Bradley, supra note 116, at 270. 
168. Cf. Weiss, supra note 162, at 18 ("The mere existence of a duty of loyalty does not 
eliminate managers' incentive to enrich themselves at the expense of their corporations. It 
does, however, inspire managers to frustrate enforcement of the duty by making it appear 
that no breach has occurred. The fact that most shareholders own only a small proportion 
of a company's stock enhances the prospect that such tactics will succeed, because those 
shareholders have little incentive to incur the cost of closely monitoring management con-
duct or of maintaining derivative lawsuits to recover corporate losses."). 
Others have made the point that derivative suits are an especially inefficient, and some-
times irrational way to secure loyal performance by corporate managers. Fischel & Brad-
ley, supra note 116, at 271-73. I do not pursue that point here. For further discussion of 
problems raised by the use of the derivative suit as a means of deterring unacceptable 
conflict of interest transactions, see Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Es-
say on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 789,809-11 (1985). 
169. See A.L.l. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Draft No. 5, § 5.02(b). 
170. See Marsh, supra note 1, at 55-57. The fact that the likelihood of success is smaller 
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mechanism of the derivative suit is available, a single shareholder 
(or his attorney) may have insufficient incentive to pursue a self-
dealing claim against these odds. This is especially true in corpo-
rations willing to advance litigation ~osts to self-dealing directors 
in order to support their vigorous defense. 171 
Even when plaintiffs prevail in establishing to a court's satis-
faction that a conflict of interest transaction is, as a matter of 
law, unacceptable, the remedy to the corporation is usually 
merely to void the transaction and return the parties to status 
quo. Directors found to have engaged in inappropriate self-deal-
ing are not routinely removed from (or enjoined from re-taking) 
their board positions. Punitive damages are seldom awarded172 
and constructive trusts seldom imposed.178 Neither the corpora-
tion nor its managers are at substantial economic or reputational 
risk.17" 
IV. PossiBLE ADDITIONAL DETERRENTS 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the available deterrents, 
even when taken together, fail to curb many conflict of interest 
abuses of the corporate control relationship. There are several 
possible responses to this fact. 
The first is to consider reinstatement of the prohibition against 
managerial self-dealing, which would be both regressive and po-
tentially costly to shareholders. The second is to assert that the 
risk of abuse is one of the inherent risks of investment, not suita-
ble for further policy response. The cost of any additional regula-
still in other types of fiduciary duty cases does not alter this conclusion. See Schwartz, 
supra note 167, at 326 ("[M]anagement's greatest liability exposure is for breaches of the 
duty of loyalty. Such cases are far more appealing [than are duty of care cases] to lawyers 
who bring suits on contingent fee bases. They are easier to prove, and their facts typically 
glean more sympathy from judges and juries. The legal rules relax the burden of proof for 
plaintiffs in cases· involving the duty of loyalty."). 
171. Cf. RMBCA § 8.53. Indeed, the availability of indemnification to corporate manag-
ers who (inevitably) settle such cases severely impairs the deterrent impact of liability 
rules. 
172. But see Stone v. Martin, 355 S.E.2d 255, 260 (C.A.N.C. 1987); Holi-Rest, Inc. v. 
Treloar, 217 N.W.2d 517, 525-26 (Iowa 1974). 
173. But see Garner v. Pearson, 543 F. Supp. 549, 559-60 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Levin v. 
Levin, 43 Md. App. 380, 405 A.2d 770, 776 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
17 4. As one example of the lack of opprobrium attendant to claims of self-dealing, one 
might cite the current circumstances of Alexander M. Haig, the former beneficiary of Alle-
gheny International's $10,000 per day consulting agreement, supra note 160, and currently 
a candidate for nomination to be President of the United States. 
412 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:369 
tory action would likely far outweigh the resultant savings from 
protection against managerial opportunism which would inure to 
shareholders as a whole or in any single corporation.175 If an in-
vestor is concerned about managerial conflicts of interest, he may 
limit his investments to those corporations subject to SEC over-
sight, or to those with 100 or more shareholders incorporated in 
California, where he can be assured at least of annual disclosure 
and the opportunity, in most cases, to exercise his exit option. He 
may also advance charter amendments prohibiting conflict of in-
terest transactions or requiring their disclosure in individual com-
panies. Across-the-board regulatory action, however, is inappro-
priate and not cost effective. 
The third response is to try to identify a mechanism in addition 
to those already in place by which unacceptable conflict of inter-
est transactions can be more effectively deterred within all corpo-
rations. This is, of course, the challenge currently facing the ALI 
Project on Corporate Governance. Several mechanisms have been, 
or might be, suggested. 
A. Private Ordering 
Some contractarian scholars have suggested that problems of 
conflict of interest may most fruitfully be addressed by private 
arrangements among shareholders. For example, Judge Easter-
brook sparked substantial debate when, at the 1986 ALI meeting, 
he suggested that shareholders by charter amendment be permit-
ted to "opt out" of any general policy restrictions on managerial 
self-dealing advocated in the Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance.176 Presumably, Judge Easterbrook would acknowledge that 
shareholders in a given corporation similarly could agree to go be-
yond the aspirational goals. of the ALI, and vote to "opt in'' and 
175. C/. Easterbrook, supra note 117, at 546 ("It is inevitable that a substantial amount 
of undesirable slack or self-dealing will escape punishment by markets. The question is 
not whether it occurs, but whether the costs of this [conduct] can be reduced by mecha-
nisms that are not themselves more costly."); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, 
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 259 (1977) ("A paradox thus 
results: maximizing the yield to investors generally may, indeed almost surely will, result 
in a number of cases of fraud or self-dealing; and eliminating all fraud or self-dealing may 
decrease the yield to shareholders generally."). 
176. Schwartz, Clark & Dooley, supra note 132, at 703. This "opt-out" concept is a par-
ticular favorite of SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest. See Concept Release on Take-
overs and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1986-87] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,018 (July 31, 1986). 
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limit managerial conflict of interest transactions more than would 
the Principles of Corporate Governance or than does current state 
law. Corporations could build into their charters a prohibition 
against conflict of interest transactions or a dollar limitation on 
those transactions which could be authorized without submission 
to the shareholders. 
This solution raises a number of problems. First, it puts the 
burden of identifying those conflict of interest transactions most 
pernicious to a given corporation on those least informed about 
them and least capable of evaluating their-potential harm. Sec-
ond, it assumes the existence of a shareholder/fomentor willing to 
undertake substantial costs solely in anticipation of managerial 
wrongdoing-costs which include the expense of gathering and 
analyzing information and soliciting proxies, as well as the poten-
tial cost of isolation and oppression by the managing majority. 
Only institutional shareholders are likely to undertake these 
costs. Third, reliance on private ordering assumes equal bargain-
ing power, e.g., the shareholder/fomentor who does emerge is con-
sidered capable of fashioning a consensus. In fact, the likelihood 
that a non-management shareholder will successfully advance and 
secure a charter or bylaw amendment is slight, particularly where 
the very focus of the amendment involves a limitation on man-
agement discretion. Thus, while private ordering does have the 
advantage of tailoring a solution to the particular needs of a cor-
poration and not interfering with corporations not in need of re-
straint, that advantage is essentially meaningless, particularly in 
those corporations where minority shareholders are already 
oppressed. 
B. Prior Restraint 
One institutional way to deter unacceptable business relation-
ships would be to require advance submission of all proposed con-
flict of interest transactions to outside evaluators who would de-
termine whether or not such transactions were "fair," or 
affirmatively advantageous to the corporation. 
1. Shareholder Waiver of Conflict 
Traditional agency principles would suggest that proposed con-
flict of interest transactions should be submitted to a corpora-
tion's shareholders for their express advance consent. This proce-
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dure would be consistent with the fiduciary principles expressed 
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency177 which requires an 
agent contemplating a transaction in which a conflict of interest 
might arise between himself and his principal to inform his prin-
cipal of the potential conflict and to receive the principal's con-
sent before proceeding.178 
Agency principles have been applied in the professional world 
to require advance disclosure and consent to potential conflicts of 
interest in a variety of settings. The application most familiar to 
lawyers is that required under the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct when a lawyer is approached by a prospective cli-
ent the representation of whom might impermissibly divide the 
lawyer's loyalties.179 The general rule for lawyers, consistent with 
the Restatement, is that the lawyer may undertake the represen-
tation, notwithstanding her potential conflict of interest, so long 
as she has made full and complete disclosure to the prospective 
client in advance of the representation, detailing the nature of her 
conflict, and the client has waived the conflict. 180 
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957). 
178. Id. § 390. Of course, the use of agency principles does not provide a perfect match 
because directors are more than agents for the shareholders in whose interest they serve. 
A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Draft No. 5, at 15 ("Since directors have ultimate 
control over the corporation (subject only to approval by the shareholders in certain lim-
ited circumstances), they do not stand in the traditional relationship of an agent to his 
principal."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 177, § 14 comment c ("The directors of a corpora-
tion for profit are fiduciaries having power to affect its relations, but they are not agents 
of the shareholders since they have no duty to respond to the will of the shareholders as to 
the details of management."); cf. Brudney, supra note 123, at 1428-30; Winter, supra note 
175, at 278. 
179. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1983). 
180. Rule 1.8(i) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not 
represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer 
knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after 
consultation regarding the relationship. 
A similar constraint is imposed on real estate brokers who find themselves negotiating 
with a relative on behalf of a client in the sale or purchase of a house. Like the attorney 
with a potential conflict of interest, the broker 
violates his duty if, unknown to his employer and in the latter's behalf, he un-
dertakes to sell to, or purchase from, one to whom he is related by the ties of 
kindred, for his natural desire to favor his own would be more or less detrimen-
tal to the interests of his employer. He cannot, in negotiating for the sale or 
purchase of property, act as a representative of both seller and purchaser, unless 
each of the latter consents to such an arrangement. 
Annotation, Duty of Real Estate Broker to Disclose That Prospective Purchaser is a Rel-
ative, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1307 (1952). See generally Horstman, Dispelling Myths: Modern Rules 
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If agency principles were applied to managerial conflict of in-
terest transactions, disinterested shareholders would be entitled, 
as is the prospective legal client, to advance notice of the transac-
tion; to a full illumination of the material facts bearing on the 
potential risks to their interests, before those interests are com-
promised; to an opportunity to weigh the potential risk against 
the potential advantages; and to the choice of whether to prohibit 
the transaction or permit it to proceed. 
The use of this analogy in a business conflicts context is obvi-
ously problematical. There is the problem of direct cost. Certainly 
it is far more cumbersome-and costly-to attempt at a meeting 
or through the mail to induce a perhaps considerable number of 
shareholders to waive a potential conflict of interest, than to in-
duce a single prospective client to do so. 181 
There is additionally the policy question as to why a share-
holder, or more precisely the entire body of shareholders (pre-
sumably excluding those who will profit from the proposed con-
flict of interest transaction), should be entitled to vote on a 
transaction otherwise clearly within the province of corporate em-
ployees or the board of directors simply because of the identity of 
the parties thereto. 
Current views of the appropriate locus of corporate governance 
hold that only the most "fundamental transactions" are subject 
to direct shareholder control, and even those transactions gener-
ally must be overseen by management.182 Certainly, shareholders 
Governing Practices of Husband and Wife Lawyers, 74 ILL. B.J. 460 (1986); Stein, The 
Hiring Dilemma of the Attorney Couple: No Spouse and Conflict of Interest Rules, 58 
FLA. B.J. 605 (1984); Comment, Ethical Concerns of Lawyers Who Are Related by Kinship 
or Marriage, 60 OR. L. REv. 399 (1981); Recent Development, Ethical Issues Facing Law-
yer-Spouses and Their Employers, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1435 (1981). 
181. Cf. Brudney, supra note 123, at 1437 ("Consent by dispersed investors in the con-
text of a single transaction to which alternatives are rarely offered is hardly the kind of 
consent a single principal can give to resolve uncertainty about his agent's discretion."); 
Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse, supra note 128, at 584 ("Direct review by the body of 
shareholders is seldom an efficacious instrument of accountability in publicly held corpo-
rations because of the disparate and shifting nature of the shareholder body and the com-
plexity of modern management issues."). 
182. Under the RMBCA, the determination and timing of distributions (dividends) is 
totally within the purview of the board, RMBCA § 6.40; the board may remove and re-
place officers without shareholder assent, § 8.43(b); the board may in several ways amend 
the articles of incorporation without shareholder approval, § 10.02; and in any event must 
initiate any proposed amendment to the articles submitted to the shareholders, § 10.03. 
The board must also initiate any proposed merger, share exchange or sale of assets other 
than in the regular course of business,§§ 11.01, 11.02, 12.02; the board has the sole author-
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are not entitled-nor should they be-to a dispositive vote on 
day-to-day operating issues such as consultant selection, the ap-
propriate terms for property rental agreements, and the myriad 
miscellaneous contractual issues raised by conflict of interest 
transactions. 
A few states currently require shareholder approval before a 1 
corporation may make certain loans to corporate directors or 
others.183 Presumably, a policy determination was made in these 
states that these sorts of transactions-involving the expenditure 
of funds inuring to 'the benefit of management insiders-present 
such an opportunity for insider abuse that shareholders ought to 
be entitled, as a prophylactic act, to advance notice and the spe-
cific right to approve or disapprove them. The Waiver of Conflict 
Model would rest on a comparable policy determination that non-
loan transactions involving management conflicts of interest re-
present the sort of conduct which presents such risks of abuse 
that advance shareholder scrutiny is required. 
Advancing on this ground a shareholder Waiver of Conflict con-
cept would not only fail to acknowledge the declining commit-
ment of the states to statutory director-loan enabling provi-
sions, 18' but would also fail to recognize some exigencies of 
ity over disposition of "all, or substantially all," of the corporation's property, so long as it 
takes place in the usual and regular course of business, § 12.01. 
Little is left for shareholder decision, other than approval or rejection of mergers, share 
exchanges and sales of assets, § 11.03, and election and removal of directors, § 8.08. 
183. E.g., CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-3-101(1)(0 (1986) (requires affirmative two-thirds vote of 
shareholders to authorize a loan to a director, unless articles of incorporation dictate oth-
erwise); N.J. STAT: ANN. § 14A:6-11 (West Supp. 1986) (loans to directors are limited to 
those granted pursuant to employee benefit plans adopted by the shareholders or reflected 
in the certificate of incorporation or by-law adopted by the shareholders); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAW § 714 (McKinney 1986) (any loan to a director must be approved by the sharehold-
ers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-22 (1983) (any loan to a director, officer or dominant share-
holder must be approved by the shareholders); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 16-10-43 (1987). See 
generally Barnard, supra note 16. 
184. Most states currently permit executive loans so long as the corporation's board has 
determined that the loan or guarantee "benefits the corporation." Shareholder approval is 
not required. 
The Delaware General Corporation Law provides: 
Any corporation may lend money to, or guarantee any obligation of, or other-
wise assist any officer or other employee of the corporation or of its subsidiary, 
including any officer or employee who is a director of the corporation or its sub-
sidiary, whenever in the judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assis-
tance may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation. . . . 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). . 
See also ALA. CoDE § 10-2A-69 (1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-047 (1977); CAL. CoRP. 
CoDE§ 315 (West Supp. 1987) (applies only to corporations with 100 or more shareholders 
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corporate life. Loan approval seldom presents an emergency to 
the corporation. By contrast, there may be a genuine corporate 
need to consummate a supply contract or a property lease which 
incidentally involves a conflict . of interest long before shareholder 
approval could be obtained. 186 
In short, notwithstanding its arguable doctrinal origins, the 
Waiver of Conflict Model is impractical and too expensive to ad-
vance as a serious proposal. 
2. Administrative Intervention 
An alternative mechanism of prior restraint would be the sub-
mission of any proposed conflict of interest transaction to an in-
dependent reviewer. In his seminal article on corporate conflicts 
of interest two decades ago, 186 Professor Marsh proposed that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission conduct an administrative 
review of any conflict of interest transaction contemplated by a 
corporation subject to its oversight.187 This proposal presents di-
rect cost problems similar to those evident in the Waiver of Con-
flict Model, as well as others. 
First, any .Proposal that the SEC engage in "merit regulation" 
of conflict of interest transactions would certainly be met with 
jurisdictional objections. Even if these were overcome (by legisla-
tive action, for example), legitimate questions would remain as to 
what the SEC's enforcement priorities should be. 
which have adopted a charter provision authorizing board approval, and also applies only 
to loans to officers, not directors); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.141 (West Supp. 1987); IDAHO 
ConE§ 30-1-47 (1980); IND. ConE ANN.§ 23-1-35-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); IowA ConE ANN.§ 
496A.4(6) (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6303 (1981); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
271A.235 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); Mn. CoRPS. & Ass'Ns ConE ANN. § 2-416 (1985); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.1548 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.501 (West 1985); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1115 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:47 (Supp. 1986); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-11 (West Supp. 1986) (statute also requires, in the case of loans to 
directors, that they be made pursuant to a provision in either the certificate of incorpora-
tion, by-laws approved by the shareholders, or a plan adopted by the shareholders); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-89 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 118, § 1029 (1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 
57.226 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-42 (1985); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 33-13-170 (Law Co-op 
1987); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-2-65 (1983); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 23A.08.455 
(Supp. 1987); W. VA. CoDE § 31-1-101 (1982); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-140.1 (Supp. 1986); 
RMBCA § 8.32. 
184. Even where circumstances provide adequate time, the shareholders authorized to 
vote on the matter may have insufficient incentive to respond· effectively. Cf. Anderson, 
supra note 127, at 784. 
186. Marsh, supra note 1. 
187. /d. at 73-76. 
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Given that the SEC through its comprehensive disclosure re-
quirements already addresses itself, albeit imperfectly/88 to 
problems of managerial conflicts of interest in companies subject 
to its oversight, expansion of its regulatory authority to include 
transactional review would likely only marginally reduce the inci-
dence of insider abuse in those companies, at substantial cost. 
Rather, the need for external intervention, if one exists, is greater 
in the case of those corporations not subject to SEC oversight.189 
This raises the spectre of state regulators, already engaged in 
merit regulation of securities offerings and other transactions by 
both SEC and non-SEC entities, evaluating the "fairness" of pro-
posed corporate conflict of interest transactions. Such a process 
would necessarily raise the cost of any such contemplated trans-
action, sometimes in a manner out of all proportion to the value 
of the transaction to the corporation itself. For example, assume a 
corporation has the opportunity to rent factory or office space at 
an advantageous price from one of its directors or an entity con-
trolled by her. When factoring in the cost of securing regulatory 
approval, both direct (such as attorneys fees) and indirect (most 
notably the cost of time, especially in those states where merit 
regulators already experience substantial backlogs), 190 the trans-
action no longer presents any competitive advantage. The corpo-
ration therefor~ has no incentive to drive a good bargain with its 
officers or directors, who might be inclined to submit to such 
terms more so than arm's length bargainers. 
There may be other problems with administrative intervention, 
including regulatory competence, employee integrity and creating 
adequate incentives to maximize shareholder value where the 
decisionmaker herself is not a shareholder.191 Many of these ob-
jections could be satisfied by resort to some form of peer 
review. 1~2 
But regardless of the locus of review, requiring prospective 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40. 
189. See Knauss, supra note 156. 
190. For a more comprehensive discussion of the costs and logistical problems associ-
ated with "merits" review of proposed transactions, see Makens, Who Speaks for the In-
vestor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 458-59 
(1984); Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 899, 934-35 (1982). 
191. Anderson, supra note 127, at 784, 788. 
192. Many professions enforce professional standards of conduct by a peer review mech-
anism. While it typically involves an after-the-fact inquiry, some settings (for example, 
those involving medical/ethical considerations) require prospective peer evaluation. 
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scrutiny of all conflict of interest transactions in order to detect 
those that may be unacceptable is, like shareholder Waiver of 
Conflict, too costly and too intrusive to constitute a serious 
proposal. 
C. Retrospective Review 
Professor Brudney has recently suggested that management be 
required to submit conflict of interest transactions to some ad-
ministrative agency for post-facto review.198 Shareholder-initiated 
review is a better proposal given that most transa'ctions brought 
forward would already have passed some threshold of suspected 
unacceptability. Such a process would surely be advantageous to 
managers when compared with uniform mandatory review. It 
would also provide substantial time and cost savings over litiga-
tion to a shareholder seeking the opinion of a third party as to 
the propriety of a particular transaction. 
Central to the viability of such a proposal are (1) the availabil-
ity to shareholders of necessary information1" and (2) some reso· 
lution on the issue of relief. Options as to the latter range from a 
binding decree annulling an unacceptable transaction (unlikely in 
any forum short of litigation) to an advisory opinion declaring 
unacceptability, immediately disclosed to the public and specifi· 
cally disclosed to shareholders in the next proxy solicitation. 
Shareholder-initiated peer review (which the author prefers to 
governmental review )1"' would provide an additional, relatively 
unintrusive deterrent to unacceptable conflict of interest transac-
tions in both publicly- and privately-held corporations, would en-
193. Brudney, supra note 123, at 1431 n.73 and accompanying text. Professor Eisenberg 
has suggested at least that "structural changes" raising conflict of interest problems 
should be submitted to some governmental body for review. M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, 
at 35-36. He includes within this framework corporate contractions, liquidations and merg-
ers into acquiring companies. /d. at 32-33. 
194. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
195. Just as lawyers, through bar disciplinary panels, may be called upon to review cli-
ent complaints of professional misconduct, it should be equally possible to encourage cor-
porate executives, through a self-regulatory process, to review shareholder complaints of 
unacceptable self-dealing. Possibly the National Association of Corporate Directors, which 
purports to "accredit" corporate directors and "promot[e) effective corporate leadership 
through programs and services," NATIONAL AssOCIATION or CoRPORATE DIRECTORS, PRo-
GRAMS AND SERVICES HANDBOOK 2, could organize such an undertaking, much as the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers has done through its Arbitration Program to ad-
dress investor complaints. Alternatively, the newly-formed United Shareholders 
Association might play this role. 
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hance the efficiency of the market for managerial labor, and 
would promote the enforcement of group norms within the "pro-
fession" of corporate fiduciaries. 
D. Registry 
An alternative less burdensome than prior restraint or retro-
spective review would be a system requiring disclosure of all con-
flict of interest transactions to a centralized registry, much as is 
currently required of persons acquiring 5% or more of the shares 
of an SEC-registered corporation198 or of certain shareholders 
when they acquire or dispose of their holdings.197 
This model, aimed at companies not already providing disclo-
sure pursuant to SEC guidelines, is derived from the federal Eth-
ics in Government Act (EIGA)/98 which requires federal officials 
to make annual disclosures of their personal and family business 
activities in order to permit the public to be informed concerning 
potential external influences on their decisions. 199 The EIGA was 
crafted "to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity 
of public officials and of the institutions of the Federal Govern-
ment,"200 and in part to "deter conflicts of interest from aris-
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1981); 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-1 (1987). 
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1981); 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-1 (1987). 
198. 2 U.S.C. §§ 701" 707 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). 
199. Under the Act, members of Congress, candidates for Congress and certain persons 
on the congressional staff must file an annual report which discloses, among other things, 
the source and amount of any income received during the preceding year from any source 
other than their legislative salary, the source and value of gifts received, and their invest-
ments, debts, and purchases. Id. § 702. 
Much of the information which must be disclosed for the member of Congress, candi-
date or staff member must also be disclosed with respect to the income, gifts, investments, 
debts and purchases of his spouse or dependent child. Id. § 702(d)(1). Except in the case 
of spouses who are estranged, living apart and contemplating dissolution of their marriage, 
there must be disclosure (somewhat more limited than that required of the "reporting 
individual") of the spouse's income, most gifts and reimbursements. ld. §§ 702(d)(2), 
702(d)(1)(A)-(C). Spouses' (and children's) investments, liabilities and purchases must be 
reported unless (i) they represent the spouse's (or child's) sole financial interest or respon-
sibility and which the reporting individual has no knowledge of; (ii) they are not in any 
way, past or present, derived from the income, assets or activities of the reporting individ-
ual, and (iii) the reporting individual does not derive or expect to derive any financial or 
economic benefit from them. Id. § 702(d)(1)(D). The financial disclosure, once filed, be-
comes a public record. Jd. §§ 703-704. Similar disclosures are required of the President, 
Vice President, members of the federal judiciary, high-ranking military officers, and highly 
placed officials of the executive branch. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). 
200. S. REP. No. 95-170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4217. 
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ing."201 Although the Act does not prohibit a member of Congress 
(or members of his family) from accepting honoraria, gifts or in-
terest-free loans, etc., it was designed to "ensure that what he 
does will be subject to public scrutiny."202 "Public financial dis-
closure," Congress believed, "[would] better enable the public to 
judge the performance of public officials. By having access to fi-
nancial disclosure statements, an interested citizen [would be able 
to] evaluate the official's performance of his public duties in light 
of the official's outside financial interests. "203 
Similar purposes could be served by imposing, under state cor-
porate law, comparable reporting requirements upon members of 
corporate management. Just as public voters are informed by fi-
nancial disclosure bearing on their representatives' independence, 
information concerning management conflicts of interest would 
be of use to shareholders in evaluating officers' and directors' per-
formance of their fiduciary duties.204 
Paraphrasing liberally from the Ethics in Government Act, cor-
porate officers and directors under this model could be required 
to disclose annually to centralized registry some or all of the fol-
lowing information: 
(1) the source and amount of any income received during the 
preceding [fiscal] year from any entity which does, or has solic-
ited, business with the corporation 
(2) the source and value of any gifts received in value exceeding 
$200 from any entity which does, or has solicited, business with 
the corporation; 
(3) information concerning the nature and extent of investments 
or management involvement in, any entity, which does, or has 
solicited business with the corporation; 
(4) information concerning indebtedness in excess of $200, to 
any entity which does, or solicits business with, the 
corporation. 2011 
201. Id. at 4238. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. The issue may be posed as whether these corporate fiduciaries should, as a matter 
of public policy, be entitled as one of the perquisites of their position to enrich themselves 
or their families without the knowledge of the shareholders whom they serve, or whether 
they should be held to a standard of disclosure to their "constituents" not unlike that to 
which public officials are held. 
205. A similar formulation, until recently utilized by the British under the United King-
dom Companies Act, required comparable information to be included in the annual report 
(there known as the "Directors' Report")-
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Consistent with the EIGA, the information required to be dis-
closed would include information concerning officers or directors 
personally, as well as spouses or dependent children. Investors 
and others concerned with conflict of interest transactions could 
then consult the registry prior to voting at the annual meeting or 
prior to lending money to the ;reporting corporation. 
· Mandatory retrospective disclosure of this . sort does not pose 
either the philosophical or logistical problems present in the prior 
restraint models. It does not intrude into necessary management 
decisionmaking processes. Unlike other forms of financial report-
ing, such as audited financial statements, projections or line of 
business information, the cost of conflict of interest disclosure is 
minimal. 206 
The registry format is especially sensible because it does not 
involve multiple printing or distribution costs, and puts material 
information only into the hands of persons-including investment 
advisors, lenders and individual shareholders-willing to ask for 
and arguably inclined to act on it. More generally, this proposal 
would, as Professor Brudney advocates, reduce the disparity be-
tween what investors generally believe (e.g., that managers are 
considerably constrained in their ability to divert corporate assets 
to themselves) and reality.207 
There are of course shortcomings to the registry format. The 
If at the end of the financial year there subsists a contract with the company in 
which a director of the company has, or at any time during that year had, in any 
way, whether directly or indirectly, an interest and, in the directors' opinion, the 
contract is a contract of significance in relation to the company's business and in 
which the director's interest is material, the report must contain: 
(1) a statement of the fact of the contract's subsisting; 
(2) the names of the parties to the contract, other than the company; 
(3) the name of the director, if not a party to the contract; 
(4) an indication of the nature of the contract; and 
(5) an indication of the nature of the director's interest in the contract. 
Halsbury's Laws of England, Companies Act of 1967, § 689. 
206. See Securities Act Release No. 6441, Exchange Act Release No. 19290, Dec. 2, 1982. 
1982 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [CCH] 11 83,281, at 85,533. As initially proposed, Item 404 would 
have required disclosure of transactions involving all relatives of primary reporting per-
sons who were "no more remote than first cousins." Id. at 85,536. This proposal provoked 
complaints that it would impose an "impracticable compliance burden," and ultimately 
was amended to limit the class of persons for whom disclosure was required to "members 
of the immediate family." Id. The SEC in adoptint this change felt that the "immediate 
family" reporting requirement would facilitate adequate disclosure . . . of those transac-
tions in which conflicts of interest are most likely to exist without imposing undue bur-
dens upon registrants." Id. 
207. Brudney, supra note 123, at 1440, 1415-20. 
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most basic concerns the questionable effectiveness as a deterrent 
of any form of mandatory disclosure, already discussed.208 Addi-
tional drawbacks focus upon notions of corporate "privacy" and 
upon the administrative costs of centrally maintaining and re-
trieving the filed information. 
Of the two, privacy is the more compelling concern. State cor-
porate law traditionally has required corporations to make availa-
ble to the public only the most basic of identifying information. 
The RMBCA requires annual disclosure only of the corporation's 
name, headquarters address, identity and location of its regis-
tered agent, identities and business addresses of its directors and 
principal officers, a brief description of the nature of its business, 
and the total number of authorized and issued shares.209 Finan-
cial disclosure is not required, nor is information concerning spe-
cific management decisions during the preceding fiscal year. Even 
those states which require mandatory annual disclosure to share-
holders do not require financial or other information which would 
be material to investors to be filed for public access. Creating a 
central registry of conflict of interest information would not only 
alter this tradition of corporate privacy but would, in the absence 
of a centralized registry of financial information, place dispropor-
tionate emphasis on the conflict of interest issue. 
E. Response to Inquiry 
A modest approach to deterring unacceptable conflict of inter-
est transactions would be to amend state shareholder access pro-
visions to require corporations not already subject to SEC disclo-
sure guidelines to disclose the existence of and material facts 
concerning conflict of interest transactions to shareholders re-
questing that information. This would be consistent with the cur-
rent practice in most states of requiring corporations to provide 
annual financial reports only to those affirmatively requesting 
them and is not unworkable, as the more demanding California 
experience demonstrates. Such an approach could be proposed 
when the ALI completes its work on shareholder entitlement to 
208. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. Registry as an alternative to proxy 
disclosure does offer the advantages of brevity and focus. Item 404 information frequently 
escapes shareholder scrutiny as a result of the length, detail and complexity of a prospec-
tus or proxy solicitation. 
209. RMBCA § 16.22. 
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corporate information. 210 
This simple proposal would minimize objections based on cost, 
privacy, and corporate governance considerations. Like the regis-
try proposal, it would avoid the problems of informational over-
load on those shareholders whose economic incentives are insuffi-
cient to lead them to process management information. It would 
reward the diligent. The ALI Corporate Governance Project 
might in fact find a partial solution to the problems presented by 
Part V of that project211 simply by making an affirmative state-
ment regarding shareholder's rights to receive information con-
cerning managerial conflicts of interests in Part III. 
V. A MODEL 
None of the existing statutory models for disclosure of manage-
ment conflicts of interest-Item 404 of Regulation S-K,212 Section 
1501 of the California Corporations Code213 or the Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act214-provides a wholly satisfactory model for a state 
statute mandating annual corporate disclosure of material conflict 
of interest transactions. For example, the SEC requires disclosure 
of all conflict of interest transactions in which the amount in-
volved is $60,000 or more.215 California requires disclosure of con-
flict of interest transactions involving $40,000 or more. 216 What 
this approach misses is that transactions involving considerably 
less than these amounts-transactions which maY, not be material 
to the corporation in an accounting sense-may nonetheless be 
material to non-management shareholders in their capacity as 
voters reflecting upon managerial competence and integrity.217 • 
210. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.25 (forthcoming). 
211. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, Tent. Drafts Nos. 5 and 7. 
212. See supra note 16. 
213. See supra notes 148-49. 
214. See supra notes 198-99. 
215. 17 C.F.R. 229.404(a} (1987}. 
216. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1501(a)(l) (West Supp. 1987). 
217. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. For example, suppose that a corpo-
ration with $1 million in annual sales makes $25,000 payments annually to the CEO's 
mother as a "consulting fee." Upon discovery by the IRS, deductions for the payments are 
disallowed. Or take a corporation which leases office space from a partnership in which 
three directors are the general partners. The annual rental is $36,000, but the space is 
vacant and unused (or used by the partners for non-corporate purposes). Either of these 
transactions may not be material to the corporation in an accounting sense, but may, 
under the circumstances, be material to the non-management shareholder in the TSC 
sense. While selecting a figure beyond which any transaction may be deemed material is a 
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A second correctable defect involves California's failure· to re· 
quire disclosure of executive compensation. 218 Compensation pay· 
ments may be challenged by the IRS, but under California's 'for· 
mutation, so long as the officers do not engage in contractual 
relationships with the corporation outside of their compensation, 
excessive compensation need not be disclosed. As the SEC has 
recognized, any proper proposal must include mandatory disclo· 
sure of executive compensation. 219 
The EIGA's limitation on reportable transactions to those in· 
volving "dependent children"220 similarly overlooks the signifi-
cant possibility of abuse where non-dependent children are con-
cerned.221 Perhaps most importantly, California's waiver of the 
disclosure requirement for corporations with less than 100 share-
holders222 fails to protect many of the shareholders most in need 
of protection. 
It would seem a small step to amend existing state corporation 
laws to require that the information now required to be provided 
annually to shareholders, whether automatically or upon request, 
be extended to include the following information: 
Transactions (including the payment of routine compensation) 
between the reporting company and any of its directors; transac-
tions (including the payment of routine compensation) between 
the reporting company and any of its officers or senior execu-
tives; transactions (including the payment of routine compensa-
tion) between• the reporting company and any member of the 
immediate family of any of its directors, officers, or senior exec-
utives; and transactions between the reporting company and any 
entity in which a director, officer, or senior executive or any 
member of his immediate family owns 10% or more equity 
reasonable approach to mandatory disclosure, any proposal whose intent is to deter exploi-
tive or improper conflict of interest transactions-or at least to expose for scrutiny those 
of material interest to non-management shareholders-may have to take into account 
other formulas as well. 
218. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 1501 (West Supp. 1987). 
219. 17 C.F.R. 229.402 (1987). 
220. 2 u.s.c. § 702(d)(l) (1985). 
221. As one court observed in the context of a public official's potential conflict: 
Although common sense dictates that an official may have no economic inter-
est in [the property of a nondependent child], nevertheless he may react favora-
bly, or without total objectivity, to a proposal which could materially enhance 
the value of that property. Disclosure might ... inhibit any such sympathetic 
reaction .... 
County of Nevada v. MacMillan, 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345 (1974). 
222. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 1501(b) (West Supp. 1987). 
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interest. 
An exemption from these requirements could be adopted for 
corporations of thirty-five or fewer equity participants ("closed 
corporations") in which the familiarity and interaction among 
shareholders would take the place of disclosure. This exemption, 
however, should be available only upon approval by a super-ma-
jority of shareholders entitled to vote. 
Individual transactions with a dollar value of $10,000 or less 
need not be disclosed. Where a number of such transactions with 
an aggregate value in excess of $10,000 occur, however, all such 
transactions must be disclosed. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Managerial conflicts of interest are neither new nor unique to 
the corporate setting.223 They are a fact of life in a world where 
business decisions are driven by human beings. 
Even among publicly-held and publicly-traded corporations, 
where existing deterrents to self-dealing are most confluent, man-
agerial conflicts of interest-notwithstanding their embarrass-
ment potential-are a common occurrence. 
While much of this behavior may be wholly benign, it may also 
reflect uncritical patterns of corporate decisionmaking detrimen-
tal in the long term to shareholder wealth and economic stabil-
ity.224 Some self-dealing is, of course, harmful fn the short run 
and unacceptable as a matter of law. In either · case, it is impor-
tant that such behavior continue to be scrutinized and new ways 
tested to deter its excesses. The task to date has been impeded by 
223. See, e.g., L. ABRAMSON, JuDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE CoDE 
OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT (1986); Annotation, Disqualification of Judge Under 28 U.S. C. § 
455(b)(4), Providing for Disqualification Where Judge Has Financial or Other Interest in 
Proceeding, 55 A.L.R. FED. 650 (1981); Annotation, Disqualification of Judge Under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii), Where Judge or His or Her Spouse, or Certain of Their Relatives, 
is Known to Have an Interest That Could Be Affected by the Proceeding, 54 A.L.R. FED. 
855 (1981); Annotation, Disqualification of Prosecuting Attorney on Account of Relation-
ship With the Accused, 3 A.L.R. 3D 953, 978-82 (1982); Annotation, Relationship as Dis-
qualifying Interest Within Statute Making It Unlawful for an Officer to Be Interested in 
a Public Contract, 74 A.L.R 792 (1931). 
224. Cf. Lawrence, Kummer & Arshadi, Inside Borrowing Practices of Commercial 
Banks, 11 IssuEs BANK. REG. 28 (Summer 1987) (study of 1000,171 banks indicates that 
while excessive insider loans may not be the direct cause of bank failures, t~?.e existence of 
such loans may indicate poor management practices overall and is a major warning sign 
that a bank may eventually fail /d. at 29-30). 
1988] CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 427 
the lack of a constituency to challenge institutional self-dealing, 
whereas its advocates enjoy a strong political voice. 
Both legal and business scholars have a role to play here. More 
research is needed correlating managerial conflicts of interest 
with corporate performance. Continuing thought must be given to 
creating workable limitations on agency costs. 
Consigning problems raised by managerial self-dealing to the .. 
IRS and the SEC, neither of whose purposes include enhancing 
corporate performance, is not a sufficient answer. Nor is reliance 
on idealized notions of economic behavior. 
Rather, the search must continue, incorporating the insights of 
many disciplines. Managerial conflicts of interest and the result-
ing widespread diversion of corporate funds cannot continue to be 
treated as a trivial or intractable phenomenon. 
